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BEYOND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
TABATHA ABU EL-HAJ* 
Abstract: While the public blames the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Citizens United v. FEC for the outsized political influence of the super-
wealthy, experts in the field know that the constitutional constraints on our ability 
to limit the political influence of moneyed elites long-predate Citizens United 
and pose a formidable barrier to effective campaign finance reform. Neverthe-
less, the most consistent calls in legal circles are for yet more campaign finance 
reform. This Article argues that it is time for those serious about curtailing the in-
fluence of money in politics to recognize that the struggle for effective campaign 
finance reforms has run its course. Renewed democratic accountability requires 
an organized, informed, and representative electorate. The field of election law 
must, therefore, come to grips with the evidence that the apparent crisis of repre-
sentation is attributable to profound social and political changes since the 1970s, 
foremost among them, a transformation of civic associations critically linked to 
legal choices. While increasing the representativeness of the electorate that turns 
out to vote must remain a key priority for the field, it is time to attend to the ways 
that law might encourage civic reorganization—just getting voters out on election 
days is too little too late. In making this argument, this Article defends two con-
troversial claims: First, the First Amendment tradition poses a formidable barrier 
to curtailing the influence of moneyed interests regardless of the composition of 
the Supreme Court. Second, the widespread skepticism in the field that the elec-
torate can be a source of democratic accountability is overstated: The fact that 
voters, as individuals, are incapable of monitoring elected officials does not fore-
close the possibility that voters, as groups, could demand democratic responsive-
ness. In fact, the historical record reveals that ordinary citizens can exercise in-
fluence over the officials elected to represent them when they are well organized 
and vote. 
INTRODUCTION 
Poll after poll reveals a bipartisan consensus that wealthy interests exert 
too much political influence. A poll conducted in June 2015 by the New York 
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Times found that 84% of Americans believe there is too much money in poli-
tics and 66% believe that “wealthy Americans have more of a chance to influ-
ence the elections process than other Americans.”1 More recently, a Bloomberg 
poll found that 87% of Americans support reforming “campaign finance [laws] 
. . . so that a rich person does not have more influence than a person without 
money.”2 
The public’s concern that the wealthy are exercising unprecedented polit-
ical power is supported by ample evidence. New studies by prominent political 
scientists document the ways that the super-wealthy are able to thwart legisla-
tion that runs against their interests while manipulating, to their advantage, the 
details of laws passed.3 The political influence of moneyed elites even extends 
to issues where a clear majority of citizens disagree with their policy prefer-
ences.4 
While we do not expect representatives to simply follow the public’s or-
ders, the public is certainly entitled to be troubled by the evidence suggesting 
that their elected officials are unresponsive to popular opinion. The confined 
nature of the debate over federal tax policy encapsulates this unease: Although 
54% of Americans and 75% of Democrats favor raising taxes to address the 
needs of the least well off in society, the tax reform proposals from Democrats 
for the past decade call for only modest and narrowly targeted tax increases.5 
Republican politicians, meanwhile, consistently support tax cuts as the solution 
to poverty and income inequality despite the fact that less than 35% of the pub-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2N88-GPGA]. 
 2 Bloomberg Politics National Poll, Study #2126 (Sept. 18–21, 2015) [https://perma.cc/7FRY-
VUJ3]. 
 3 See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASH-
INGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); Joe Soss 
& Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-participation in the American Polity, 124 POL. 
SCI. Q. 95 (2009). 
 4 See infra notes 46–60 and accompanying text. 
 5 See Pew Research Ctr., Most See Inequality Growing, but Partisans Differ Over Solutions, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/23/most-see-inequality-growing-but-
partisans-differ-over-solutions/2/ [https://perma.cc/MY7E-ZFPU]; see also Bryce Covert, Opinion, 
$250,000 a Year Is Not Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
28/opinion/campaign-stops/250000-a-year-is-not-middle-class.html [https://perma.cc/TML2-PFXF] 
(discussing Democratic tax policy proposals); John McCormick & Arit John, Oh Canada! Four in 10 
Americans Want Wall on Northern Border, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.
com/politics/articles/2015-09-24/oh-canada-four-in-ten-americans-want-wall-on-northern-border 
[https://perma.cc/JN6Y-MMBT] (finding that 73% of respondents believe that “[t]he tax code should 
be reformed so rich people pay proportionately more than middle-class people”); Greg Stohr, Bloom-
berg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
28, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-09-28/bloomberg-poll-americans-want-
supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot [https://perma.cc/6AVX-JGPM]. 
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lic accepts this view.6 As the United States Supreme Court, in McCutcheon v. 
FEC, reiterated in 2014, “[R]esponsiveness is key to the very concept of self-
governance through elected officials.”7 
In the public’s imagination, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citi-
zens United v. FEC is to blame for the outsized influence of money in politics.8 
Experts in the field, however, know that the constitutional constraints on our 
ability to limit the political influence of moneyed elites predate Citizens Unit-
ed.9 Individuals have long been entitled to spend their money to influence elec-
tions,10 and prior to Citizens United, savvy, well-represented corporations 
knew how to do so as well.11 Constitutional protections for other forms of in-
fluencing government policy, such as lobbying or shaping political debate 
through private funding, are even stronger. Nevertheless, the most consistent 
calls in legal circles are for yet more campaign finance reform.12 
While the public and election lawyers are preoccupied with the flow of 
money into electoral politics, many political scientists contend that the appar-
ent crisis of representation arises out of a fundamental weakening of the chan-
nels of democratic accountability since the 1970s—one that facilitates the 
translation of economic capital into political power. Two sources of the weak-
ening of political responsiveness stand out. The first is the state of political 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Noam Scheiber, 2016 Hopefuls and Wealthy Are Aligned on Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/30/business/candidates-and-wealthy-are-aligned-on-inequality.
html [https://perma.cc/QK3U-48QZ]. 
 7 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014); see also ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: 
PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971) (contending that the essence of democracy is “continued 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”). 
 8 See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The recent Bloomberg poll found 
that 80% of Republicans and 83% of Democrats believe that Citizens United should be overruled. See 
Stohr, supra note 5 (noting further that “‘Citizens United has become a symbol for what people per-
ceive to be a much larger problem, which is the undue influence of wealth in politics’”) (quoting Pro-
fessor David Strauss). 
 9 The term “moneyed elites” is used in recognition of the fact that elites are not singular. Capital 
comes in many forms: economic, social, knowledge-based, political, and cultural. These different 
forms of capital give rise to different axes of power in modern societies. Elites with different bases of 
power compete with one another as they seek political influence. This account of elites and capital is 
best described in the work of French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of 
Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITAL 241, 241–58 
(J. G. Richardson ed., 1986). 
 10 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55–58 (1976). 
 11 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, The Floodgates Were Already Open: What Will the Supreme 
Court’s Campaign Finance Ruling Really Change?, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/the_floodgates_were_already_open.html 
[https://perma.cc/AZ4D-D9ES]. 
 12 See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Michael S. Kang, The Brave New 
World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanop-
oulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2015). 
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parties.13 The second, and the one that is the focus of this Article, is a trans-
formation in the character of American civic associations.14 
Indeed, in 2004, the American Political Science Association’s Task Force 
(“APSA Task Force”) attributed the solicitude of government officials to the 
preferences of wealthy citizens in large part to their increasing organizational 
advantage as compared to the middle class.15 It pointed to the fact that private-
sector unionism has radically declined and that lower-income Americans today 
are only about a third as likely as the affluent to belong to an organization that 
takes a stand on public issues.16 Others emphasize that the civic associations 
that remain are ineffective at empowering ordinary Americans: Based in Wash-
ington, D.C. and largely financed by foundations, promoting broad, informed 
electoral participation has fallen off associations’ agendas.17 
Relying on this literature, this Article argues that those concerned about 
the outsized political influence of moneyed elites need to stop wasting their 
limited resources chasing after campaign finance reforms aimed at taking 
money out of politics and doctrinal theories aimed at justifying those reforms. 
Any path to renewed democratic accountability will have to run through an 
organized, informed, and representative electorate, and election lawyers should 
begin the process of reimagining their roles.18 Specifically, the focus should 
shift to ways the law might encourage civic reorganization while continuing to 
pursue representative turnout on election days. 
In making this argument, this Article defends two controversial claims. 
First, chasing after effective campaign finance reforms is futile. Money tends 
to find its way into the political process through regulatory loopholes. Citizens 
United has unquestionably multiplied and expanded the loopholes available. 
                                                                                                                           
 13 In a separate project, I am exploring how the dearth of political accountability currently flow-
ing from our party system might be addressed by re-theorizing how we expect political parties to 
enhance responsiveness. 
 14 The focus on civic associations has an added payoff in a world in which administrative agen-
cies are the source of a significant amount of policymaking insofar as strong civic associations are 
likely to facilitate a broad range of political participation beyond voting. See generally Tabatha Abu 
El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom 
of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014). 
 15 Am. Political Sci. Ass’n Task Force, American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality, 2 
PERSP. ON POL. 651, 657 (2004) [hereinafter APSA Task Force]. 
 16 Id. at 655. 
 17 See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MAN-
AGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (2003). 
 18 Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–15 (noting that “[i]n a republic where the people are sover-
eign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential”) 
(emphasis added), with Derek Willis, Campaign Finance Reforms Turn to Reward and Punishment, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/upshot/campaign-finance-reform-
turns-to-reward-and-punishment.html [https://perma.cc/3DNP-QB9B] (describing a number of exper-
iments being funded to increase democratic accountability—none of which involve increasing turnout 
let alone empowering the electorate). 
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Still, the bottom line is that few experts believe campaign finance legislation 
has ever been particularly effective even in the hands of a more liberal Su-
preme Court.19 Changing the composition of the Supreme Court might make 
certain campaign finance reforms more possible, but it is unlikely to signifi-
cantly undermine the political influence of those with money to spend on poli-
tics. Even reforms aimed at publicly financing elections, whether fully or 
through matching fund programs, are not immune to this displacement effect. 
The barriers to effective regulation of the financing of electoral cam-
paigns derive from the First Amendment’s traditional philosophical commit-
ment to government neutrality and individual autonomy. The First Amendment 
must secure some avenues for electoral and political influence. In a capitalist 
economy where wealth is not equally distributed, as a practical matter, this will 
favor those who possess the resources to exercise their rights. 
Second, this Article challenges the widespread skepticism that the elec-
torate can be a source of democratic accountability.20 Although voters, as indi-
viduals, are busy, distracted, and find it difficult and time consuming to obtain 
good information about what elected officials are doing on the job,21 the pic-
ture looks different when these citizens are organized. The fact that voters, as 
individuals, are incapable of monitoring elected officials, in other words, does 
not foreclose the possibility that voters, as groups, could ensure democratic 
responsiveness.22 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Can Anything Be Done About All the Money in Politics?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/can-anything-be-done-about-
all-the-money-in-politics.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W9EC-3JG5] (“There are some clear conclu-
sions to be drawn from the 50-year struggle by reformers to place limits on the role of money in poli-
tics. Foremost is that when the goal of reformers has been to bar large donations from corporations, 
unions and the rich, their efforts have a brief half-life and end in failure.”). 
 20 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Romaticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the De-
cline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 851–52 (2014). Such skepticism is pervasive in 
the field of election law partly because the field has been heavily influenced by mid-twentieth century 
American political science that is deeply ambivalent about mass political participation. See Bob Ed-
wards & Michael W. Foley, Civil Society and Social Capital: A Primer, in BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE: 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 7–8, 11 (Bob 
Edwards et al. eds., 2001). As a result, although election lawyers tend to support robust voting rights, 
they do so primarily for the legitimacy voting confers on elite choices and in honor of its intrinsic 
value to individuals. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 331 (1993) 
(arguing that “the vote should be protected not simply because it enables individuals to pursue politi-
cal ends, but also because voting is a meaningful participatory act through which individuals create 
and affirm their membership in the community and thereby transform their identities both as individu-
als and as part of a greater collectivity”). 
 21 See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and 
Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 577–78 (2012) (theorizing that ordinary 
voters are incapable of effectively holding politicians accountable due to their large “blind spot” with 
respect to information about official behavior). 
 22 This Article, in other words, stands within the democratic romantic tradition that offers popular 
sovereignty based solutions to democratic dysfunctions. It offers, however, a non-individualistic path 
to popular sovereignty, focusing on the importance of civic associations as necessary intermediaries if 
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Well-structured civic associations can foster political engagement and 
turnout, while solving the difficulties that individual voters have in staying 
informed.23 Good evidence shows that ordinary citizens can exercise influence 
over the officials elected to represent them when they are well organized and 
vote.24 The absence of significant cuts to Social Security and Medicare is a 
testament to this phenomenon.25 The older beneficiaries of these programs 
have successfully fended off elite advocacy for the dismantling and privatiza-
tion of these two New Deal programs. Putting to one side the merits of the pol-
icy debate, the pertinent point is that their success can be attributed to two re-
lated facts: first, they are well organized by the American Association of Re-
tired Persons (“AARP”), and second, elected officials are well aware that they 
turn out regularly on Election Day.26 The fact that the AARP’s wins come at 
the expense of the needs of other Americans, in particular younger Americans, 
points to the accountability issues that arise when citizens are ineffectively or-
ganized politically. A relatedly second theme of this Article is that who votes—
and more importantly who does not vote—matters a great deal to how respon-
sive government policymaking will be.27 
In sum, this Article’s central claim is that if the ultimate goal of campaign 
finance reform is to confront the drive toward plutocracy, it is time for “small-
d” democrats to turn their attention to how law might undercut the influence 
money buys, rather than the flow of money per se.28 An attentive, empowered, 
                                                                                                                           
widespread political participation is to be a powerful political force. Cf. Pildes, supra note 20, at 814–
15 (characterizing the American tradition of popular sovereignty as “distinctively individualistic” and 
criticizing it for failing to recognize the role of mobilization, specifically by political parties, as the 
means for empowerment). 
 23 See infra notes 144–168 and accompanying text. 
 24 The term “ordinary voters” means those who lack the kind of money it takes to have a phone 
call sent directly to their representatives. 
 25 See infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Martin Gilens, Policy Consequences of Representational Inequality, in WHO GETS REPRE-
SENTED? 247, 248, 272–74 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011) (noting that the AARP 
“as a mass membership organization[]” functions as “a conduit through which the influence of less 
well-off Americans flows”). 
 27 Despite the invocation of the electorate, this Article is based on a pluralist vision of democracy 
and assumes that in a well-functioning democracy there should be “no permanent winners or losers.” 
BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 11, 16, 
25 (2015) (noting that the pluralist model of democracy depends on “fluid coalitions” arising out of 
“democratic contestation between interest groups and political parties” to achieve consensus and se-
cure good governance). See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER 
IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1st ed. 1961) (describing pluralist democracy in 1950s New Haven as one in 
which economic elites were one of many groups influencing public policy as part of shifting coali-
tions). 
 28 For an exceedingly persuasive account of the value of pursuing reforms aimed at changing 
electoral dynamics, see generally Robert Bauer, Getting a Handle on the Super PAC Problem, STAN. 
L. SYMP. (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Super
PACs.pdf [https://perma.cc/V797-D6HS] (arguing for a series of pedestrian reforms to mitigate the 
effect of Super PACs on “the electoral process” itself). 
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and representative electorate is the only feasible path to mitigate the influence 
that moneyed elites currently exert over political outcomes.29 
Reform-minded lawyers must, therefore, turn their attention to the ways 
that law can enhance the civic and political organizations of ordinary Ameri-
cans while continuing to increase the representativeness of the electorate that 
turns out on election days. This will require undertaking new projects. The no-
tion that lawyers might have a role to play in civic reorganization, in particular, 
will strike many as a foreign one, but the evidence is clear that the political 
disorganization of ordinary American citizens is not simply happenstance. 
Regulatory reforms since the twentieth century have unintentionally under-
mined their political capacity. 
To be sure, economic elites will not raise a white flag in the face of a re-
surgence of the political power of average Americans. Even if reform succeed-
ed and an informed, watchful electorate turned out on Election Day in a way 
that tethered the policy choices of elected bodies to popular opinion, the Em-
pire would strike back. History shows that the political power of economic 
elites waxes and wanes. At the moment, new strategies are desperately needed 
to hasten the waning side of the cycle. This Article explains how evidence 
from political science supports the course recommended. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the evidence supporting 
the public’s view that this is a period of heightened political influence for eco-
nomic elites. In doing so, it seeks to get a handle on the slippery concept of 
undue influence. Part II defends the proposition that it is time to move beyond 
campaign finance reform if the goal is to contain the outsized influence of 
moneyed interests. Part III elaborates on the obstacles to achieving democratic 
accountability through voting. It explicates why simply increasing electoral 
participation will not reinstate the sort of elections that pull officials toward the 
interests of the broader public while making the case that democratic account-
ability to the electorate requires civic reorganization. Part IV explains why ef-
forts to increase the representativeness of the electorate remain important. This 
Article concludes with a first cut at the new priorities this implies for the field 
of election law. 
I. THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE OUTSIZED INFLUENCE  
OF MONEYED ELITES 
There is good evidence to support the public’s perception that the wealthy 
are exercising unprecedented political power. In fact, many academics share 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Empowering the electorate is likely to increase the level of money in politics. It takes money to 
support organizations that draw citizens into politics. It takes money to register eligible voters and 
stimulate new voters, and it takes money to get out the vote. This Article is not offering a path to re-
ducing the level of money in politics but rather to reducing the undue influence of moneyed elites. 
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the public’s concern that our republican form of government is under threat 
from mutually reinforcing concentrations of economic and political power.30 
With the return of extreme economic inequality in the United States, they ar-
gue that an era in which the super-wealthy are exercising outsized political 
influence has come.31 
Although the United States has always had income inequality, the degree 
of that inequality and the rate at which it is growing has returned to levels un-
seen since before the Great Depression.32 Between 1973 and 2000, while the 
bottom 20% of earners saw their income rise by a mere 10.3%, the top 20% 
and top 5% had a 61.6% and 87.5% increase in their income respectively.33 By 
way of comparison, between World War II and the early 1970s, Americans’ 
income roughly doubled regardless of their position on the socioeconomic lad-
der.34 
Wealth inequality today is even starker than income inequality.35 The su-
per-wealthy, in particular, have experienced the fastest growth in income and 
wealth. Between 1974 and 2007, the top 0.1% of earners experienced a four-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 64–65 (2014) (arguing that “there are good reasons to worry that electoral integrity today is 
under threat” and that “we are once again experiencing what most regard as a crisis of representation” 
arising out of concerns about the role money plays in elections and the resulting absence of “trust and 
confidence in . . . [our] representative institutions”); Lawrence Lessig, Out-Posting Post, in CITIZENS 
DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 102 (arguing that mem-
bers of Congress have permitted themselves to become “dependen[t] upon the funders of political 
campaigns,” who constitute “less than .05 percent of America,” in ways that are inconsistent with the 
constitutional structure that presupposes that the people are the primary force “within the economy of 
influence that [drives] Congress”); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Consti-
tution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 671 (2014) (“The constitutional problem of oligarchy is the danger that 
concentrations of economic power and political power may be mutually reinforcing—and that because 
of this, sufficiently extreme concentrations of power may threaten the Constitution’s democratic foun-
dations.”). 
 31 See Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin I. Page, Oligarchy in the United States?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 
731, 732 (2009) (defining oligarchy as “the exercise of power by the richest citizens—who happen 
always to be ‘the few’”). See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008) (reexamining, in light of the vast increase in economic 
inequality, Robert A. Dahl’s question, “Who governs in our democracy?”). 
 32 BARTELS, supra note 31, at 12–13 fig. 1.4 (comparing the income shares of the top 5% and top 
1% of earners between 1917 and 2005 and concluding that “current levels of income inequality rival 
those of the Roaring Twenties, before the Great Depression wiped out much of the financial wealth of 
the nation’s reigning upper class”). 
 33 APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 652–53; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 
12–40 (reviewing data on rising inequality). 
 34 Accord BARTELS, supra note 31, at 8–9 fig. 1.1 & 1.2 (comparing changes in real income and 
cumulative income growth); Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 100–02, 102 fig. 1 (providing statistics 
and graphics); see APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 652 (noting that “[i]n the immediate postwar 
period, income growth was steady and comparable across the income distribution”). 
 35 APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 653 (explaining that in 1999 “the bottom 90 percent of 
households” which “earned the majority of household income (58.8 percent) . . . controlled only 29 
percent of the country’s wealth”). 
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fold increase in their income.36 By 2005, the average income of a CEO was 
262 times that of an average American worker (compared to twenty-seven 
times in 1973).37 Meanwhile, economists estimate that “the share of total 
household wealth accrued by the top 1 percent of families—those with wealth 
of more than $4 million in 2012—increased to almost 42 percent in 2012 from 
less than 25 percent in the late 1970s.”38 Furthermore, the vast majority of this 
increase has fallen to the top 0.01% of families, those with wealth of more than 
$20 million in 2012.39 
Perhaps more importantly, this rise in economic inequality has been criti-
cally exacerbated by the policymaking choices of Congress.40 Federal tax poli-
cy is illustrative. In 2001, Congress enacted tax cuts in which “the richest 1 
percent of Americans . . . reaped roughly 40 percent of the total tax rewards of 
the 2001 tax bill—a share almost identical to that received by the bottom 80 
percent on the income ladder.”41 When Congress went back to the drawing 
board in 2003, the tax cuts it passed “showered $184 billion over ten years on 
the 184,000 households with incomes above $1 million . . . . [That] $184 bil-
lion was the same total amount received by the 124 million households (90 
percent of the population) with incomes below $95,000.”42 A range of other 
federal policies has had similar effects.43 
Reviewing the literature, the APSA Task Force concluded, “Policies pur-
sued—or not pursued—help to explain sharper socioeconomic disparities in 
the United States compared to nearly all other advanced industrialized coun-
                                                                                                                           
 36 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that the top 0.1% of earners have gone from 
earning a 2.7% share to a 12% share of income in this timeframe); see also BARTELS, supra note 31, 
at 10 fig. 1.3 (graphically representing the significant income growth for the top 0.01% compared to 
the top 5% of earners from 1945 to 2005). 
 37 Winters & Page, supra note 31, at 734. 
 38 Heather Boushey, Understanding Economic Inequality & Growth at the Top of the Income 
Ladder, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Oct. 15, 2014), http://equitablegrowth.org/research-
analysis/economic-inequality-growth-top-income-ladder/ [https://perma.cc/4CD2-NBJ9] (summariz-
ing the work of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 31, at 3 (finding that “[e]conomic inequality is, in substantial 
part, a political phenomen[a]” insofar as public policy in the United States has not sought to mitigate 
the effects of technological and global forces); see also Jacob S. Hacker et al., Inequality and Public 
Policy, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO 
LEARN 156, 159–73 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005) (reviewing state of the art 
research on the wealth and income effects of U.S. public policies since the 1970s in comparison to the 
policies of other advanced industrial democracies). 
 41 JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 46 (2005). 
 42 Id. (noting further that “while the average millionaire received $100,000 [in tax relief], the 
average family in the middle of the income ladder received $217”). 
 43 See also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 42–56 (describing a host of policies that have 
exacerbated economic inequality since the 1970s). 
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tries.”44 A key data point in this regard is that other first-world democracies 
have not experienced the same rate of increase in income inequality despite 
experiencing similar global economic changes.45 
The fact that the United States has become highly economically stratified 
and that this stratification can be attributed, at least in part, to legislative poli-
cies is not per se evidence of the undue influence of economic elites. Studies, 
however, provide substantial evidence that the policies that have facilitated 
heightened economic inequality have been pursued regardless of the public’s 
views.46 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, for example, paint a vivid picture 
of the myriad ways politicians undertake “policymaking that starkly and re-
peatedly departs from the center of public opinion.”47 The legislative battles 
from George W. Bush’s presidency, they argue, reveal party leaders repeatedly 
advocating policies hugely beneficial to corporate interests but distanced from 
the choices of the electorate.48 In a follow-up study, they reveal a similar pat-
tern on the Democratic side.49 Martin Gilens’ seminal quantitative study of 
policy responsiveness found that, across all policy domains, legislative “re-
sponsiveness is strongest for high-income Americans and weakest for the 
poor” and that this differential responsiveness is starkest for economic policy.50 
In fact, a growing body of research suggests that Congress, in particular, 
is significantly more responsive to the views of American elites than to the 
views of either poor or middle class Americans. One recent study comparing 
the influence on public policy of average citizens, economic elites, and interest 
                                                                                                                           
 44 APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 654. 
 45 See, e.g., Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, 102 (noting that “[b]y 2006, the share of income en-
joyed by the top one-tenth of 1 percent of families was two to four times greater in the United States 
compared to situations in Britain and France”). 
 46 See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 31, at 2 (“I find that elected officials are utterly unresponsive to 
the policy preferences of millions of low-income citizens, leaving their political interests to be served 
or ignored as the ideological whims of incumbent elites may dictate.”); see also id. at 223–51 (outlin-
ing the consistent lack of democratic responsiveness that has led to the erosion of the federal mini-
mum wage). 
 47 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 16. 
 48 Id. passim. But see BARTELS, supra note 31, at 173–75, 287–89 (demonstrating that the ex-
treme economic inequality experienced in the United States is substantially related to federal policy-
making and that currently the “American political system” allows policymakers “considerable lati-
tude” to pursue their own goals, even with respect to “issues on which public opinion seems to be 
especially firm and stable,” but arguing that these policymaking choices have been driven by the ideo-
logical and partisan commitments of elected officials, rather than the preferences of their wealthy 
patrons, and expressing disagreement with Hacker and Pierson’s account of the Bush tax cuts). 
 49 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 236–41 (providing evidence that key figures in the 
Democratic Party have repeatedly answered to the interests of moneyed elites on economic matters); 
see also id. at 281 (attributing the disjuncture between Connecticut voters’ overwhelming support for 
publicly provided universal health care and Senator Leiberman’s opposition to it to the antipathy of 
Connecticut’s insurance industry to the public’s favored position). 
 50 MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POW-
ER IN AMERICA 113–17 (2012); see also id. at 102–03 fig. 4.2 & 4.3. 
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groups of various sorts concluded that “economic elites and organized groups 
representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. 
government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have 
little or no independent influence.”51 When support for a given proposal 
among affluent Americans reaches 75%, “that policy is adopted 46 percent of 
the time”; by contrast, when middle-class Americans show a similar level of 
support for a policy, it “is adopted only 24 percent of the time.”52 The authors 
wryly conclude that the United States today is a “democracy by coinci-
dence.”53 They explain: “To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens 
always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because 
those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically elite citizens 
who wield the actual influence.”54 In a prior work, one of the authors conclud-
ed: “The American government does respond to the public’s preferences, but 
that responsiveness is strongly tilted toward the most affluent citizens. Indeed, 
under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of Americans 
appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does or 
doesn’t adopt.”55 Indeed, the author found that “[w]hen less-well-off Ameri-
cans hold preferences that diverge from those of the affluent, policy respon-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 565, 568–70 (2014) (basing the study on a 
data set that measured 1779 policy issues between 1981 and 2002); see also id. at 572 (analyzing the 
magnitude of the effect); Gilens, supra note 26, at 247. 
 52 Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with Our Analysis of U.S. Political Inequali-
ty. Here Are 5 Ways They’re Wrong, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challenge-our-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-
heres-5-ways-they-are-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/TVJ9-GK5R] (noting further that the opposition to a 
policy by 25% of affluent Americans results in a 4% chance of adoption, whereas a policy similarly 
opposed by the middle class has a 40% chance of adoption). None of the main critics of Martin Gilens 
and Benjamin Page’s study substantially undermine these main findings or their conclusion that the 
United States is a democracy of coincidence. See, e.g., Omar Bashir, Testing Inferences About Ameri-
can Politics: A Review of the “Oligarchy” Result, 2 RES. & POL. 1, 1–2 (2015) (criticizing Gilens and 
Page’s quantitative method); Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation, 
13 PERSP. ON POL. 1053, 1058–60 (2015) (arguing that coincidental representation insures respon-
siveness to middle-income voters most of the time and concluding that “[i]f ‘rich people rule,’” it does 
not appear to be “at the expense of those in the middle”). For additional responses to the critics, see 
generally Martin Gilens, The Insufficiency of “Democracy by Coincidence”: A Response to Peter K. 
Enns, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 1065 (2015) and Martin Gilens, Simulating Representation: The Devil’s in 
the Detail, 3 RES. & POL. 1 (2016). 
 53 Gilens & Page, supra note 51, at 573. 
 54 Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
 55 GILENS, supra note 50, at 1–2, 5 (summarizing the findings from a study analyzing the respon-
siveness in policymaking, rather than congressional roll-call votes, to preferences of Americans from 
different income brackets in which “affluent” was defined as the top 10%, those with incomes over 
$135,000 in 2010). 
1138 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1127 
siveness to the well-off remains strong but responsiveness to lower-income 
groups all but disappears.”56 
Reviewing the literature, the APSA Task Force reached a similar verdict: 
“The bias in government responsiveness toward the affluent is evident not only 
in Congress but also in national government policy more generally. Govern-
ment officials who design policy changes are more than twice as responsive to 
the preferences of the rich as to the preferences of the least affluent.”57 The 
reform of prescription drug coverage under Medicare provides the most suc-
cinct illustration of the tendency to pursue the goals of funders even when 
those goals are at odds with the known preferences of the broader public.58 
Various features of the bill, including limitations on the federal government’s 
ability to bargain down the price of prescription drugs, were included at the 
behest of pharmaceutical interests; most importantly, the law ultimately adopt-
ed differed significantly from the informed public’s opinion.59 Equally im-
portant, these deals were deliberately disguised to benefit moneyed elites.60 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. at 5; see also id. at 81–82 (reviewing data showing “complete lack of responsiveness to the 
poor” and only minimally improved responsiveness to median-income Americans “when their policy 
preferences diverge from those of the well-off” and that this holds true even when median-income is 
redefined as 70th income percentile). 
 57 APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 659 (emphasis added); accord BARTELS, supra note 31, at 
275, 280–81 (showing that although “senators are consistently responsive to the views of affluent 
constituents[,]” they are “entirely unresponsive to [the views of] those with low incomes,” and it 
would be a mistake to attribute this unresponsiveness to differences in turnout, political knowledge, or 
personal contacts); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 2–4 (“All activity in contemporary GOP 
circles,” according to “moderates within the Republican fold, . . . is focused on pushing policy as far 
right as possible while delivering tangible benefits to the ruling party’s most deep-pocketed and ex-
treme supporters.”); Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the 
Poor in the American States, 57 J. POL. SCI. 552, 553, 560–62 (2013) (showing that the policy posi-
tions of state political parties are most responsive to the preferences of affluent constituencies and that 
this is particularly true for the Democratic Party). But see Yoseph Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How 
Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the U.S. Senate?, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED?, supra note 26, 
223, 223–46 (reviewing the limitations and complexity of Larry Bartel’s study). 
 58 Hacker and Pierson offer a similar analysis of the tax cuts enacted in 2001, noting that even late 
in the legislative process, polls indicated that, “by an extraordinary 53-point margin,” the public sup-
ported readjusting the tax cut so that it benefited lower-income households and that the administration 
understood this. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 51–53 (quoting internal Treasury Department 
memos that acknowledged that “[t]he public prefers spending on things like health care and education 
over cutting taxes”). 
 59 Id. at 86–90 (noting further that “just before the bill passed, three-quarters of Americans sup-
ported Medicare drug coverage and nearly 80 percent of supporters said they would be personally 
willing to pay more in taxes to foot the bill” and that only 39% approved the changes to the bill made 
in the final version that came out of conference). 
 60 See id. passim (documenting through a series of case studies a pattern of hiding the distribu-
tional effects of various policies through convoluted policy choices); Bawn et al., supra note 21, at 
584–85 (arguing that through legislative machinations and policy designs that are extremely difficult 
for ordinary voters to follow, politicians, in recent years, have been able to grow the electorate’s 
“blind spot”). 
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In sum, the public has good reason to be concerned that moneyed elites 
are exercising undue influence, using their money to get elected officials to 
thwart legislation favored by the public or to pass legislative provisions disfa-
vored by the public.61 The two most striking examples, in recent years, have 
been raising the minimum wage and repealing the estate tax, both of which 
were slow in coming despite stable, overwhelming public support.62 Even 
when “the voter turnout gap between rich and poor constituents is narrowed,” 
elected officials are no more likely to represent their constituents as political 
equals.63 
Undue influence is most likely to arise with respect to economic policy, 
the area in which the preferences of the super-wealthy are most distinct from 
the general public.64 A recent “pilot study of the political views and activities 
of the top 1 percent or so of U.S. wealth-holders” is illuminating in this re-
gard.65 It found “that [the 1%] are much more conservative than the American 
                                                                                                                           
 61 This definition of undue influence sidesteps two important critiques that have been levied about 
the coherence of the concept in the context of campaign finance reforms. First, the concept is being 
used to advocate for a political solution rather than to make a constitutional argument. Therefore, it 
does not violate the traditional First Amendment commitment to neutrality between competing visions 
of good government (democracy, republicanism, and plutocracy). Second, it does not construe as 
undue influence those situations where moneyed elites successfully persuade voters. It thus does not 
make what is an ultimately untenable distinction between manipulation and persuasion. For an astute 
critique of the concept of undue influence in the context of First Amendment theory, see Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 677–78, 680–82 
(1997). For an elaboration of the idea that it is a mistake to view public opinion as an input that pre-
cedes politics, see Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic 
Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55, 56–57 (2004). 
 62 BARTELS, supra note 31, at 218, 251 (arguing that “for partisans of popular sovereignty, the 
real ‘political mystery’ is not why the estate tax was phased out in 2001, but why it lasted as long as it 
did” given longstanding public opposition to it and likewise that “[t]he substantial erosion of the min-
imum wage over the past 40 years stands as a dramatic example of the American political system’s 
unresponsiveness to public sentiment” given the overwhelming public support). 
 63 See, e.g., Patrick Flavin, Does Higher Voter Turnout Among the Poor Lead to More Equal 
Representation?, 49 SOC. SCI. J. 405, 406 (2012). Patrick Flavin’s study found that “even as citizens 
at the bottom of the income distribution vote[d] at rates approaching those at the top of the income 
distribution, their Senators [were] no more likely to reflect their opinions in their roll call voting deci-
sions.” Id. at 410. Indeed, “as the mean ideology of poor citizens bec[ame] more conservative, their 
Senators’ roll call voting behavior bec[ame] more liberal.” Id. at 409. The research was not designed 
to explain the cause of this surprising finding. Id. at 410. 
 64 Cf. Winters & Page, supra note 31, at 738–40 (suggesting that the tendency toward oligarchy is 
greatest with respect to international economic policy, monetary policy, tax policy, and redistributive 
policies). This tendency may, of course, be a product of the particular period in which Americans live. 
Cf. GILENS, supra note 50, at 108–15 (noting that his study, covering the period from 1981 to 2002, 
did not find that “preferences across income groups . . . differ[ed] more in the domain of economic 
policy than . . . [with respect to] religious values” and emphasizing “the substantial number of eco-
nomic issues on which low- and high-income Americans agree”). 
 65 Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preference of Wealthy Americans, 11 
PERSP. ON POL. 51, 51 (2013) (noting at the outset the inherent difficulties of studying super-wealthy 
individuals). 
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public as a whole with respect to . . . taxation, economic regulation, and espe-
cially social welfare programs.”66 Those with a net worth of $40 million or 
more “tend to hold still more conservative views.”67 Moreover, the starkest 
differences in views pertain to jobs programs, the provision of nationalized 
health insurance, environmental regulation, deficit reduction, and the value of 
spending on Social Security benefits.68 Finally, even where the policy priorities 
of the super-wealthy and ordinary Americans converge, the former tended to 
have distinct views about the best way to solve issues. In particular, the super-
wealthy are much more likely than the general public to favor spending cuts 
and market solutions than tax increases or social expenditures. A second pre-
liminary study, based on extensive interviews with individuals with an average 
of $8.2 million in household wealth, found similarly that while their interview-
ees were aware of growing income inequality, only 17% of them favored gov-
ernment intervention through taxation to reverse the trend while most favored 
cuts to Social Security and health care.69 
II. BEYOND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
Even if our constitutional order does not require that majorities get exact-
ly what they want, the public is certainly entitled to object to being ignored. It 
is, thus, not surprising that both the public and progressive lawyers are desper-
ately seeking legal reforms to incentivize representatives to tack back to the 
public’s interests. 
Chasing after effective campaign finance reforms, however, is not the so-
lution. Money tends to find its way into the political process through regulato-
ry loopholes. While Citizens United has unquestionably multiplied and ex-
panded the loopholes available, constitutional protections for some loopholes 
go well beyond the Court’s current conservative majority.70 As such, changing 
the composition of the Supreme Court may make certain campaign finance 
reforms more possible, but it will do little to significantly undermine the politi-
cal influence of those with money to spend on politics. The First Amendment 
tradition, with its liberal commitment to individual autonomy and government 
neutrality, poses a formidable barrier to effective legislative efforts to rein in 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 52 (reviewing prior studies of political preferences of the 
top 20% and top 4% that have reached similar conclusions). 
 68 Id. at 55–64 (presenting findings in depth). 
 69 Fiona Chin, What the Wealthy Know & Believe About Economic Inequality, in BUILDING A 
STRONG FOUNDATION FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING WHETHER AND HOW ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY AFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH 43, 44–45 (Heather Boushey & Ed Paisley eds., 2014) 
(reporting preliminary findings from eighty-nine interviews with top income and wealth earners). 
 70 See infra notes 105–124 and accompanying text. 
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the electoral influence of moneyed elites.71 Equally important, it protects the 
many other avenues for exercising political influence. 
A. Avenues of Political Influence 
As we all know, the squeaky wheel gets the grease, and the wealthy—
particularly, the super-wealthy—squeak in all sorts of ways.72 If wealthier, bet-
ter-educated Americans are more likely to be politically active than ordinary 
Americans, this is even truer for the super-wealthy.73 A recent pilot study of the 
top 1% of wealthy Americans found that 99% of the respondents reported vot-
ing.74 More critically, they also regularly contact officials directly and attend 
campaign speeches and events.75 
Campaign contributions are perhaps the most important way wealthy 
Americans seek to influence elections.76 In 2000, 95% of the contributions 
over $1,000 to politicians came from households with annual incomes greater 
than $100,000 even though only about 13% of American households reported 
incomes over $100,000.77 In 2008, “incumbent members of the House of Rep-
                                                                                                                           
 71 Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408–09 (1986) 
(identifying a “Free Speech Tradition,” discernable in the Supreme Court’s decisions, that “acts as a 
constraining force on present and future decisions” and arguing, further, that a central element of this 
tradition is a commitment to government neutrality). 
 72 See generally SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1995) (documenting unequal political participation in the United States and arguing 
that this distorts policymaking). 
 73 See, e.g., Henry E. Brady et al., Who Bowls? The (Un)Changing Stratification of Participation, 
in UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC OPINION 219, 219–21 (Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2002) 
(finding that from 1973 to 1994, the richest 20% of the population (measured by income) was respon-
sible for 44% of all civic or political participation, whereas the poorest 20% was responsible for only 
1.5% of all participation). 
 74 Page et al., supra note 65, at 53–54, 54 tbl. 2. 
 75 Fay Lomax Cook et al., Political Engagement by Wealthy Americans, 129 POL. SCI. Q. 381, 
384 n.10, 387–89 (2014) (reporting the preliminary findings from a study of individuals with an aver-
age wealth of $14 million (median of $7.5 million) in which 41% had attended a campaign speech or 
meeting, and noting by way of comparison that this constituted about two to three times more political 
participation than the general public); Page et al., supra note 65, at 54 (noting that 47% of the re-
spondents in a study of the political activity of the 1% had “made at least one contact with a congres-
sional office” and further that several respondents were on a first name basis with the official contact-
ed). 
 76 See GILENS, supra note 50, at 10 (concluding that “the disproportionate responsiveness to the 
preferences of the affluent cannot be attributed to their higher turnout rates or their greater involve-
ment with political campaigns” rather “[m]oney—the ‘mother’s milk’ of politics—is the root of repre-
sentational inequality . . . as political campaigns have become more expensive”); see also Adam Bon-
ica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. EC. PERSP. 103, 111–14 (2013) 
(describing a pattern of increased inequality in campaign contributions since 1980 as well as evidence 
that both Democrats and Republicans are increasingly relying on big donors); Spencer Overton, The 
Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 76 (2004) 
[hereinafter Overton, 2004]; Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1261 
(2012) [hereinafter Overton 2012]. 
 77 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 114. 
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resentatives received only 6% of their money from individuals who contribut-
ed $200 or less.”78 
Among the wealthy, it is the super-wealthy who are particularly well posi-
tioned to exploit candidates’ and political parties’ need for campaign funds.79 A 
recent pilot study of individuals with an average wealth of $14 million (median 
of $7.5 million) found that 60% of them had made a political contribution, 
compared to 18% of the public at large.80 The vast majority, moreover, had 
made an average campaign contribution of $4,633, and a substantial minority 
were involved in bundling financial contributions to political campaigns.81 In 
2014, “the 100 biggest donors to all types of political committees together 
gave $323 million, almost matching the $356 million in small donations that 
came from an estimated 4.75 million people.”82 The full extent of spending by 
super-wealthy individuals, however, is unknown because much of it is under-
taken outside formal reporting and disclosure requirements.83 
There is little question that election contributions are made in the hopes of 
securing access to officials and, ultimately, favorable policies.84 As Justice 
Kennedy noted, “It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason 
. . . to make a contribution to[] one candidate over another is that the candidate 
will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”85 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Overton 2012, supra note 76, at 1262. 
 79 Samuel Issacharoff & Jeremy Peterman, Special Interests After Citizens United: Access, Re-
placement, and Interest Group Response to Legal Change, 9 ANNUAL REV. L. SOC. SCI. 185, 200 
(2013) (noting that, in 2012, “[n]inty-three individuals gave over $1 million to independent-spending 
groups,” including Super PACs); Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the 
Legislative Process, 92 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 75, 98 n.95 (2014) (noting that, in 2012, 
between 28% and 40% of disclosed campaign contributions came from members of the top 1%). 
 80 Cook et al., supra note 75, at 389. 
 81 Page et al., supra note 65, at 54 (noting that 21% had engaged in bundling). 
 82 IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ELECTION SPENDING 2014: OUTSIDE 
SPENDING IN SENATE RACES SINCE CITIZENS UNITED 7, 9 (2015) (noting further that since 2010 over 
$1 billion has been spent by Super PACs on federal elections and that almost 60% has been raised 
from 195 individuals and their spouses). 
 83 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, 
Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 910 (2014) (noting speculations that in 
2012 independent groups spent “well over a billion dollars . . . much [of which] . . . [could not] be 
traced to its origins” as compared to President Obama’s “record 800 million dollars”). 
 84 This is true even as the road from campaign spending to political influence is complicated and 
difficult to measure. For one, in a winner-take-all election, half of the money necessarily will have 
been wasted. For another, influence is often mediated by party leaders who distribute contributions 
that have been made to them to less well-known party candidates, who are, in turn, subject to party 
discipline. For an argument that there are good reasons to be skeptical about studies that report cam-
paign contributions do not secure influence, see Powell, supra note 79, at 79–80 (criticizing existing 
literature for seeking to measure influence of campaign donations through roll call votes alone). Polit-
ical donations to safe incumbents, who sit on powerful committees, are thought to be the most effec-
tive, especially where donors seek primarily to maintain the status quo. Id. at 82–83. 
 85 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part), overruled by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); accord McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 
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Election spending, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. The super-
wealthy, as individuals and as corporate directors, spend billions every year to 
influence politics through lobbying.86 In 2008, more money was spent on fed-
eral lobbying than on the 2008 election, which was, at the time, the most ex-
pensive election in history.87 By some estimates, “over half a billion dollars 
was spent on health-care lobbying” while the Affordable Care Act was being 
debated.88 Lobbyists are hired because of their personal ties to elected offi-
cials.89 They leverage the trust these relationships create to stall proposed leg-
islation in committee90 or to influence legislative details that fall below the 
electorate’s radar.91 Corporations, in particular, much prefer lobbying to cam-
paign spending as a mechanism of political influence.92 
The attention paid by legislatures to the interests of economic elites as a 
result of campaign spending and legislative lobbying significantly buttress the 
outsized political influence of the wealthy. Solicitousness to the interests of the 
wealthy based on electoral strength, by contrast, reflects basic democratic at-
tentiveness. It is the attention that one foregoes when one chooses not to vote. 
B. The Regressive Effects of First Amendment Protections  
for Political Influence 
Each of these avenues of political influence—those in the domain of elec-
tions as well as those in the domain of public discourse—is afforded robust 
First Amendment protection. In a capitalist economy, where wealth is not 
equally distributed, as a practical matter, this favors those who possess the re-
                                                                                                                           
(plurality opinion) (arguing that “a central feature of democracy” is the notion that “candidates who 
are elected can be expected to be responsive to [the] concerns” of those who contributed to their cam-
paigns) (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360). 
 86 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 114 (estimating total lobbying expenditures at over $3 
billion per year, nearly double what it was a decade before). 
 87 Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 1155, 1162 (2011) (noting that “federal reports suggest that federal spending on lobbying in 
2008 was 3.47 billion dollars . . . more than the 3.2 billion campaign dollars spent in what was a rec-
ord-breaking election season”). 
 88 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 275. 
 89 See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 
219–24 (2012) (noting that the bundling of campaign contributions as well as prior social and profes-
sional relationships are key elements of the access and trust upon which lobbyists rely). 
 90 Id. at 226. 
 91 Id. at 220–21(summarizing literature showing that lobbyists “thrive in areas of low light,” in-
cluding the legislative details). 
 92 In 2012, of the ninety-eight PACs that spent over $1 million, none were affiliated with a for-
profit corporation; only eight for-profit corporations contributed over $1 million to an independent-
expenditure group. See Issacharoff & Peterman, supra note 79, at 194, 200 (noting further that, ac-
cording to some studies, “[public] corporations spend approximately nine times as much on lobbying 
as they do on influencing elections”). 
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sources to exercise their rights. The right to vote lacks this side effect only be-
cause the law prohibits a market in votes. 
The First Amendment’s tendency to exacerbate the tension between capi-
talism and democracy manifests doctrinally in Buckley v. Valeo and its proge-
ny. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that money constituted speech under the 
First Amendment.93 In an ultimately misguided effort to mitigate the effects of 
this holding, the Court struck down Congress’s attempt to limit the amount of 
money that could be spent on an election campaign while simultaneously up-
holding the caps Congress had placed on the contributions that individuals and 
groups could make to election campaigns.94 The result was a regulatory catas-
trophe. As Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan explain: 
Buckley . . . produced a system in which candidates face an unlim-
ited demand for campaign funds (because expenditures generally 
cannot be capped) but a constricted supply (because there is often a 
ceiling on the amount each contributor can give). As in all markets 
in which demand runs high but supply is limited, the value of the 
good rises.95 
What emerged was a convoluted regulatory regime which distinguishes 
between campaign contributions to elected officials and political parties 
(which can be regulated), campaign expenditures (which cannot be limited 
unless there is coordination with the campaign and, thus, the expenditure func-
tions as the equivalent of a contribution), and issue advocacy, which is distin-
guished from express advocacy or electioneering communication (which can-
not be restricted).96 To make matters worse, Buckley instituted this convoluted 
regulatory regime just as campaigning became more expensive.97 
It is the basic entitlement established by Buckley to spend money to influ-
ence the outcome of an election that secures political influence to those who 
have money to spare. Since 1976, those with wealth have had a First Amend-
ment right (like everyone else) to spend as much money as they desire to influ-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1976). 
 94 Id. at 55–58. 
 95 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710–12, 1720–22 (1999) (arguing more generally that campaign finance reforms 
merely redirect the flow of political money and thus the most important question to be asked is wheth-
er the money is being directed in ways that enhance or undermine democratic accountability). 
 96 Issacharoff & Peterman, supra note 79, at 188 (defining issue advocacy as advertising expendi-
tures that “seek[] to opine on a particular issue and does not clearly endorse or oppose a particular 
candidate”). 
 97 The costs of running a campaign have increased dramatically since the 1970s. By some esti-
mates, running for the House of Representatives required, on average, the equivalent of $100,000 in 
1974, whereas in 2012, the winners of House seats had typically spent $1.5 million. The trend for 
Senate elections is similar. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 113 (including comparative 
statistics). 
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ence elections. The precise form such spending could take has varied as statu-
tory law, administrative interpretations, and judicial doctrine fluctuated, but the 
basic entitlement has been clear. 
Citizens United merely gilded the lily. It certainly and significantly in-
creased the ease with which the super-wealthy can translate their money into 
political influence98 by defining the only acceptable justification for campaign 
finance laws—the prevention of corruption—narrowly as quid pro quo corrup-
tion and by concluding that independent expenditures can never give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.99 In particular, it facilitated the rise 
of Super PACs and a variety of similar political entities.100 
The Buckley entitlement and its perverse consequences for American 
democratic institutions, however, are a product of core First Amendment prin-
ciples.101 For fifty years, legal academics have lamented Buckley. Among pro-
gressives, the arguments made include that the Court should reconsider its 
view that money is speech in the campaign finance context102 and its position 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1903 (2013) (ex-
plaining that by “enabl[ing] individual billionaires to channel their money into politics more quickly 
and prolifically than at any other time in the post-Watergate era, . . . Super PACs effectuated a regres-
sive shift in political power to the very wealthy”). 
 99 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (noting that the “governmental interest in preventing corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption . . . [is] limited to [preventing] quid pro quo corruption”); see also 
Gerken, supra note 83, at 908–09 (summarizing the change in the Court’s conception of corruption). 
 100 Extending the logic of Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit has held that individuals, as well as 
corporations and unions, are entitled to freely contribute to Super PACs as long as they solely engage 
in uncoordinated expenditures, including express advocacy for or against a candidate. See Speech-
Now.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Super PACs are defined as political action 
committees to which individuals, including corporations and unions, are entitled to contribute unlim-
ited amounts. See id. A Super PAC may not, however, contribute to a candidate’s campaign fund or 
coordinate its efforts with that candidate. Id. Similarly, because independent expenditures cannot give 
rise to the appearance of corruption, so-called multi-purpose civic groups (typically structured as non-
profit corporations) are also entitled to accept unlimited contributions for electioneering speech so 
long as their primary purpose is not electoral and they do not contribute to the campaigns of officials 
running for office or to political parties themselves. See Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 18–19 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the FEC’s constitutional authority to regulate contributions to non-profit enti-
ties, unconnected to a particular candidate or party, was limited to situations where a non-profit was 
contributing to candidates and political parties and, thus, could be used to circumvent otherwise con-
stitutionally permissible contribution restrictions to candidates and political parties). For the moment, 
such organizations are not required to disclose the names of their funders even when they engage in 
express electioneering. See generally Issacharoff & Peterman, supra note 79, at 188–90 (describing 
the FEC regulation of PACs and its intricate relationship to various tax-exempt forms that political 
groups can take under the federal tax code). 
 101 To be clear, the claim here is not that liberal democracies require viewpoint neutrality—as 
many do not—just that American liberal democracy has. 
 102 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955–56 
(2011); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1002 
(1976); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“Money is property; it is not speech. Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multi-
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that the First Amendment prohibits the government from seeking to equalize 
the opportunities to speak during elections in order to prevent distortion of the 
political.103 Liberals have called for a broader conception of what constitutes 
corruption.104 
The fundamental problem, however, is neither Buckley nor Citizens Unit-
ed. Take, for a start, the question of whether money is speech. The slogan is an 
unfortunately sloppy formulation of a very important question: whether money 
spent to influence elections (electioneering and issue advocacy) is covered by 
the First Amendment’s speech clause.105 Once rephrased, it is extremely diffi-
cult to imagine that the Supreme Court, whatever its composition, would re-
verse the central holding of Buckley that such money comes within the ambit 
of the First Amendment. It takes money to run an election—to run advertise-
ments and print flyers but also to register voters, canvas neighborhoods, and 
get people to the polls on Election Day.106 It even takes money to get the requi-
site permits to use public spaces for campaign meet-and-greets. 
The bottom line is that the foundational holding that money is a form of 
protected speech in the context of elections is solid, and the economics of 
campaigns today make it extremely difficult to imagine that the Supreme 
Court, whatever its composition, would reverse that.107 If the ability to spend 
money to influence elections were not covered by the First Amendment, there 
would be no constitutional bar against Congress banning all spending by indi-
viduals or candidates in federal elections, including to obtain permits for pub-
lic gatherings or to canvas neighborhoods to get out the vote. 
That there should be some First Amendment protection for money spent 
during an election, of course, does not answer the second-order question of 
                                                                                                                           
tude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money, meanwhile, 
has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks.”). 
 103 See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 12, at 20–25. 
 104 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN: FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); Kang, supra note 12, passim; Zephyr Teachout, 
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
 105 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (2004) (defining coverage as going to 
“scope—whether the First Amendment applies at all” to categories of speech acts such as copyright, 
commercial speech, and securities regulation; whereas protection speaks to the “strength” or “the 
degree of protection that the First Amendment offers” to covered speech). 
 106 Overton 2012, supra note 76, at 1279 (“acknowledg[ing] that money can be a tool for mean-
ingful [political] engagement[] [and] that money can serve as a gateway to other forms of participa-
tion”). 
 107 As Robert Post has explained, “When speech is dependent upon the resources necessary to 
create and disseminate it,” those resources deserve constitutional protection. POST, supra note 30, at 
46–47 (arguing that insofar as “the regulation of campaign finance expenditures sufficiently diminish-
es the exchange of ideas . . . [that is] necessary for the formation of public opinion” it is appropriate 
that money constitutes speech in this context). 
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how much protection should be afforded.108 As such, the second objection to 
Buckley is much stronger: Unlimited private spending distorts political debate 
and undermines the political equality that is central to democracy.109 Unfortu-
nately, recognizing a compelling government interest in fostering political 
equality or rectifying the political distortion flies in the face of core First 
Amendment principles that predate both Buckley and the Court’s current con-
servative majority.110 
Campaign finance laws that level down are too easily cast as efforts “to 
mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election process and 
thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of 
elections.”111 As such, much like hate speech regulation, campaign finance 
laws squarely run up against the traditional liberal commitment to government 
neutrality between citizens exercising their rights of expression.112 As Kathleen 
Sullivan explains: 
Under virtually any theory of the justification for free speech, legis-
lative restrictions on political speech may not be predicated on the 
ground that the political speaker will have too great a communica-
tive impact, or his competitor too little. Conventional First Amend-
ment norms of individualism, relativism, and antipaternalism pre-
clude any such affirmative equality of influence—not only as an 
end-state but even as an aspiration.113 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See also id. at 46–47 (arguing that the fact that it is appropriate that money constitutes protect-
ed speech does not necessarily imply that the current doctrine’s scrutiny of such regulation is appro-
priate). 
 109 See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign 
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (1991). 
 110 Cf. Fiss, supra note 71, at 1408 (“In time I became convinced that the difficulties the [Burger] 
Court encountered in the free speech cases of the seventies could ultimately be traced to inadequacies 
in the Free Speech Tradition itself. The problem was the Tradition not the Court.”). 
 111 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–26; cf. Fiss, supra note 71, at 1418 (recognizing that “laws that regu-
late political expenditures to prevent the rich from completely dominating debate . . . require some 
judgment as to which views should be heard” and thus defy the First Amendment’s presumption that 
the state should be neutral with respect to the content of speech). 
 112 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (noting that the First Amendment “[p]rohibit[s] . . . re-
strictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others”); see also 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 512–13 (1996) (offering theoretical justifications for this commit-
ment). 
 113 Sullivan, supra note 61, at 673, 680–81 (arguing that campaign finance regulations cannot be 
justified by the notion that money distorts the political process because this essentially puts legisla-
tures in the position of limiting speech to further their own vision of democracy when “what consti-
tutes proper representation is itself the most essentially contested question protected by freedom of 
speech”); accord POST, supra note 30, at 48–50 (arguing that the “logic of discursive democracy,” as 
opposed to the “logic of representation,” requires only equal opportunity to influence public discourse 
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A constitutional commitment to government neutrality in the public 
sphere makes good sense; there are very good reasons to be skeptical of gov-
ernment regulation of political speech and political action. It is this skepticism 
about legislative purpose that explains the Court’s reluctance to accept regula-
tion of campaign speech in the name of political equality, as Justice (then Pro-
fessor) Elena Kagan famously argued.114 
The equality principle also fails because, for better or worse, the United 
States has a judicially enforced Constitution, and the judiciary has thus far 
proved incapable of vindicating a positive, substantive conception of equality. 
Many in the civil rights movement learned this lesson only too well in their 
failed efforts to achieve material equality under the Equal Protection Clause.115 
It is a question of institutional competence. Finding a doctrinally administra-
ble, conceptually satisfying measure of political equality or distortion is too 
difficult a task.116 Courts would have to commit to a theory of democracy, 
which they are unlikely to do, nor is it clear that they should given that any 
vision of democracy they would come up with would be politically contesta-
ble. Unfortunately, in a capitalist world of unequal economic resources, formal 
equality translates into political inequality.117 
The most recent round of criticism of the Court’s campaign finance doc-
trine has involved an array of efforts to re-think the concept of corruption.118 
Although this is certainly the most plausible litigation strategy, its success is 
unlikely to significantly curtail the political influence money can buy. 
The problem is that the First Amendment requires that there be some un-
regulated sphere for electoral speech. So long as some aspect of electoral de-
bate will be subject to the robust First Amendment prohibition on regulating 
speech because of the speaker or viewpoints, moneyed interests will have a 
                                                                                                                           
because “[a]t their core, First Amendment rights are about meaningful participation, not about equal 
participation”) (emphasis added). 
 114 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 112, at 467 (“The Buckley principle emerges not from the view 
that redistribution of speech opportunities is itself an illegitimate end, but from the view that govern-
mental actions justified as redistributive devices often (though not always) stem partly from hostility 
or sympathy toward ideas . . . .”). For an exceedingly nuanced philosophical defense of the view point 
neutrality principle, from the perspective of one that accepts equality as a co-equal liberal value, see 
generally Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality, 107 NW. L. 
REV. 603 (2013). 
 115 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 116 See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1369, 1385 (1994) (arguing that designing a plausible and doctrinally workable measure of polit-
ical equality in the context of campaigning is far more difficult than in the context of the vote and it is 
unlikely that any court would undertake the task). 
 117 Cf. Fiss, supra note 71, at 1410 (arguing that “the problem of free speech in modern society” 
arises out of the fact that “the freedom to speak depends on the resources at one’s disposal”). 
 118 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. For a critique, see generally Deborah Hellman, 
Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013). 
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channel through which money can flow to create influence.119 This First 
Amendment loophole explains why campaign finance legislation has never 
worked all that well at limiting the political influence of moneyed elites. As 
Heather K. Gerken aptly remarked shortly after Citizens United, “[W]e should 
admit that the results of the ‘take money out of politics’ approach have been 
underwhelming. . . . Donors simply find new, less transparent ways to gain 
influence in the process.”120 
The prognosis looks only worse when one remembers that campaign fi-
nance is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to explaining the influence of 
moneyed elites on American politics. The First Amendment protects those 
forms of political influence that operate squarely in the public political domain 
even more strongly. It is difficult, for example, to imagine the Supreme Court, 
whatever its ideological composition, accepting anything beyond disclosure 
and transparency requirements for lobbying.121 
Equally important, it is not clear that it is desirable to incentivize mon-
eyed elites to spend the money they currently spend on elections in these other 
realms. The further out one goes the more insidious the influence of money. 
Wouldn’t we rather have super-wealthy individuals spending their money on 
activities that are relatively easy to monitor (electioneering and lobbying) than 
diverting it to fund ideologically driven research that will form the justifica-
tions for policies offered by foundations, universities, and courts?122 
                                                                                                                           
 119 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 222 (noting that “[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet”). 
 120 Gerken, supra note 87, at 1156. 
 121 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (noting that “the Court has upheld registration and disclo-
sure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself”) (emphasis 
added); see also Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 
STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 105, 113–14 (2008) (implying that more extensive regulation of lobbying, 
especially based on some version of an equality principle, is untenable under the First Amendment); 
Hasen, supra note 89, at 213–16 (arguing that stringent restrictions on lobbying insofar as it is core 
political speech cannot be supported by a government interest in either preventing corruption or fos-
tering equality). But see Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1131, 1131 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court has never upheld the constitutionality of lobbying 
and the historical evidence suggests that “our current lobbying system actually violates the right to 
petition”). Recently, legislatures have sought also to restrict the campaign activities of lobbyists. See 
Hasen, supra note 89, at 204–07 (noting the rise of statutes limiting the ability of lobbyists to fund-
raise for elections as well as statutes seeking to limit the revolving door between legislative bodies 
and lobbying firms). These regulatory efforts, however, are highly controversial; more to the point, 
none have sought to restrict the ability of those with money to hire lobbyists or the amount of money 
they can spend on lobbying. Briffault, supra, at 117 (noting that the focus has been on “limit[ing] or 
forbid[ding] ancillary activities, such as gifts to public officials” rather than on “restrict[ing] either the 
amount of money that can be spent on the research, informational and communications activities at the 
heart of lobbying, []or . . . limit[ing] the amounts or sources of funds used to pay for lobbying expend-
itures”). 
 122 See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, University in Turmoil over Scalia Tribute and Koch Role, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/us/koch-brothers-antonin-scalia-george-
mason-law-school.html [https://perma.cc/RF5H-ZG4L]; Justin Gillis & John Schwartz, Deeper Ties 
to Corporate Cash for Doubtful Climate Researcher, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.
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None of the above is meant to deny that there are other yields that accrue 
from regulating the flow of money during campaigns. The point is rather that it 
would be naïve to think that even the most progressive campaign finance re-
strictions on electoral spending will significantly undermine the political influ-
ence of moneyed interests.123 The primary effect of limiting the expenditure of 
money in elections will be to displace the political influence of those with 
money to spend. The First Amendment will protect unlimited political expres-
sion in some domains—be it issue advocacy, the media, lobbying, or influence 
over broader public political discourse. 
Reforms aimed at increasing the incentive for politicians to look to small 
donors through matching programs, or at toughening disclosure and disclaimer 
rules, may well enhance the legitimacy of democratic institutions but are un-
likely to increase democratic accountability to the electorate unless they are 
consciously designed to increase informed electoral participation. Matching-
fund programs, for instance, could be used to leverage increased access to can-
didates or to strengthen the power of existing membership-based political and 
civic organizations. But we should not be fooled: Increasing the value of 
online contributions to campaigns from small donors through matching pro-
grams will not in and of itself empower those donors. Similarly, pro forma dis-
closure statements frequently hide more than they reveal. 
In sum, insofar as the First Amendment both secures the existence of 
some outlets for electoral and political expression and embodies a commitment 
to government neutrality between speakers and viewpoints, it presents a formi-
dable challenge to legislative efforts to significantly curtail the outsized influ-
ence of money in politics.124 The interplay of the economics of campaigns and 
the constitutional protections afforded to individuals, including super-wealthy 
individuals, thus make it unlikely that either campaign finance reform or doc-
                                                                                                                           
nytimes.com/2015/02/22/us/ties-to-corporate-cash-for-climate-change-researcher-Wei-Hock-Soon.
html [https://perma.cc/U3J7-K2E6]. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVA-
TIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (documenting the con-
servative elites’ use of foundation money to translate economic capital into social and cultural capi-
tal—creating networks of conservative lawyers and influencing the tenor of law schools—in their 
efforts to achieve a conservative turn in judicial doctrine); Winters & Page, supra note 31, at 740, 743 
(noting that investing in policy-oriented foundations and think tanks as well as the research of aca-
demics provides a particularly promising avenue for wealthy individuals to determine the policy 
agenda). 
 123 See Bauer, supra note 28, at 5–6. 
 124 Even Frederick Schauer and Richard H. Pildes acknowledge this central premise. They con-
vincingly demonstrate that the level of First Amendment protection for political speech depends on 
context, and they argue that campaign spending should be analyzed as part of the electoral realm, in 
which equality rather than liberty prevails given the importantly different First Amendment considera-
tions involved. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1816, 1822–24 (1999) (accepting that the one thing that the First 
Amendment “make[s] irrelevant [is] features of particular speakers or speeches” such as “Nazism or 
racism”). 
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trinal readjustment is the right course if one’s aim is to meaningfully check the 
outsized influence of moneyed elites. 
III. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS, AND VOTING 
Once we acknowledge that it is time to move beyond the search for effec-
tive campaign finance reforms, it becomes clear that it is necessary to know 
much more about the dynamics that drive America’s “democracy by coinci-
dence.” The solicitude of government officials for the preferences of wealthy 
citizens and donors is a product of the fact that they hear from them more (a 
dynamic that is difficult to meaningfully address given the First Amendment), 
but also that elections appear increasingly incapable of tethering elected offi-
cials to the preferences of their constituents (a dynamic that provides an open-
ing for reformers). 
Even as the Founders aspired to a republic in which the policy prefer-
ences of citizens would be filtered through a deliberative legislative process, 
they sought to ensure accountability to constituents and the public interest 
through elections.125 In fact, periodic elections were established as the primary 
mechanism for addressing the Founders’ concern that representatives would 
act out of self-interest or at the behest of special interests.126 Achieving demo-
cratic accountability turns out to require much more than just free and open 
elections. 
Although the “conventional wisdom” suggests “that politicians who stray 
too far from their constituents’ wishes end up in the dustbin of political histo-
ry” on Election Day,127 this is no longer happening. Three interrelated trends 
explain elected officials’ ability to serve their other masters without fear of re-
buke. First, the lack of partisan competition has unmoored political parties and 
candidates from the interests of their constituents. With the rise of safe dis-
tricts, the party primary has increasingly become the most important election. 
This, in turn, has allowed the party base, including its big donors, to gain pow-
er at the expense of the general electorate. Second, it is increasingly difficult 
for all voters to keep informed about politics, even if they so desire. Thus, even 
where elections are competitive, their efficacy as a substantial check is under-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See POST, supra note 30, at 13, 15 (explaining that the Founding generation understood that “a 
representative government can fulfill the promise of self-government only if there is a close connec-
tion between representatives and their constituents” and that for Federalists, in particular, frequent 
elections were to play a critical role). 
 126 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (describing the structural devices of federalism and 
separation of powers as “auxiliary precautions”). 
 127 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 2; accord Gilens & Page, supra note 51, at 565–66 
(reviewing and critiquing “the median-voter theorem” while noting that “probably more economists 
than political scientists” continue to adhere to it); Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 116–21 (describing 
structural changes that have contributed to “weak and declining levels of responsiveness to median 
public preferences”). 
1152 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1127 
mined. This phenomenon is directly related to the third obstacle to an empow-
ered electorate, the state of civic associations. Civic associations today are not 
well positioned to serve their two central functions in our democracy—
bringing voters out on Election Day and supporting voters’ ability to monitor 
the behavior of elected officials while in office. As a result, the electorate today 
is disorganized in ways that significantly undermine its political power. Insofar 
as this Article reserves the question of how political parties could be reformed 
to improve democratic accountability, the challenge of the party primary in an 
era of uncompetitive elections will be addressed, in Part IV, as part of a larger 
discussion of the importance of representative turnout.128 
A. Learning About the Wrong Things 
Voters cannot hold elected officials accountable if they do not know when 
their representatives have made deals that cater to moneyed interests.129 In fact, 
elected officials who engage in off-center politics depend on the voting public 
not noticing when the ship is upping anchor to leave port. One extremely effec-
tive strategy, in recent years, has been to intentionally obscure the true effects 
of legislation through complexity or delegations to administrative agencies. 
Tax reforms, for example, have been structured to include phase-ins and large-
ly fictitious sunset provisions—the legislative equivalents of an adjustable-rate 
mortgage—in order to obscure both their true costs and their distributional ef-
fects.130 Another extremely effective tactic has been simply to avoid taking up 
popular issues opposed by moneyed interests, with the knowledge that inaction 
“is far less likely to attract the notice of voters.”131 
Voters’ struggles to stay informed are exacerbated by the fact that pro-
found changes to the media industry have led to a classic market failure in rel-
evant political information even for voters who wish to stay informed.132 Too 
                                                                                                                           
 128 As previously mentioned, a second article will address the question of how to achieve in-
creased accountability using political parties. 
 129 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (recognizing that “[i]n a republic where the 
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office 
is essential”) (emphasis added). 
 130 For an extensive discussion, see HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 57–67. 
 131 Cf. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 236 (explaining that Democratic Party officials’ drift 
strategy largely involves refusing to take up proposals supported by the public but opposed by mon-
eyed elites). 
 132 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 175–78. In other words, the problem goes beyond 
the fact that elected officials are rarely prone to full disclosure or that the American public is not all 
that interested in politics, both longstanding concerns of reformers. See id. at 67; see also id. at 164–
67 (describing data showing that a majority of Americans are uninformed about politics). For histori-
cal comparisons, see Glenn C. Altschuler & Stuart M. Blumin, Limits of Political Engagement in 
Antebellum America: A New Look at the Golden Age of Participatory Democracy, 84 J. AM. HIST. 
855, 855, 857 (1997) (challenging those who view the nineteenth century as a period when “political 
engagement . . . went well beyond voting, [and] was both widespread and deeply felt within the elec-
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little political information is easily accessible and what is available is the 
wrong sort of information.133 The rise of competition in the media has made it 
easier for individuals to satisfy their preferences for non-news,134 but it has 
also incentivized the underproduction of substantive news.135 The 24-hour 
news cycle, in particular, lends itself to highlighting partisan drama and ignor-
ing policy details that are difficult to make short and sweet.136 
The problem is most acute where the issues are economic and redistribu-
tive—the issues on which elected officials are most likely to be subject to dis-
tinct pressures from moneyed elites. Economic debates require dry policy in-
formation to be understood. As such, even “newspapers provide very limited 
information related to the content of policy.”137 A systematic review of news-
papers found that during the debates over Bush’s proposed tax cuts in 2001—
tax cuts whose policy details substantially benefited economic elites over the 
middle class—USA Today provided daily coverage; however, of the seventy-
eight stories run, only six focused primarily on substantive measures in the 
proposed act, and only one discussed the distributional effects.138 At “the New 
York Times . . . only 7 of the 126 stories focused on [the] distributional ef-
fects.”139 
The dearth of information is most extreme when a single media market 
covers multiple elected officials and when the issues are less salient.140 Exac-
                                                                                                                           
torate” and arguing instead that a substantial number of “American voters were disengaged from polit-
ical affairs”) and Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democ-
racy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (explaining the various ways in which “[e]lite New York politi-
cians . . . lied, cheated, and masked themselves as the people” in their efforts to “manipulate[] popular 
opinion” and achieve their ends in order to emphasize similarities between politics today and in the 
1790s). 
 133 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 177 (explaining that not only has the sheer volume “of 
political news . . . steadily declined in the major media outlets,” but the news that is reported is unlike-
ly to be substantively informative). 
 134 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 156 (remarking that “[b]efore cable, Americans who 
wished to watch TV during prime news hours had little choice but to be exposed to broad public af-
fairs programming” and that the choices cable provided has only been multiplied with the rise of the 
Internet). 
 135 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 176–78 (arguing that as “the news media [has increas-
ingly found itself] in the entertainment business rather than the information business[,] . . . a premium 
[has been placed] on drama and brevity,” it has stopped paying attention to precisely the sort of infor-
mation that individuals need to be informed as voters). 
 136 See id. at 176–77 (explaining that to the degree that television news continues to report on 
politics, it tends to emphasize political drama rather than the details or nuances of pending legislation, 
which “require many words to explain and typically yield poor visuals”). 
 137 Id. at 177. 
 138 Id. at 178. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Bawn et al., supra note 21, at 583 (noting that where everyone in a media market is represent-
ed by a single congressperson, journalists have a much greater incentive to cover his or her actions but 
that most voters do not live in such districts); see also SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW 
INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES 128 
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erbating this trend, local newspapers increasingly lack the resources to dedi-
cate reporters to Congress and thus must rely on national outlets that frequent-
ly do not focus on the records of particular members of Congress from those 
regions.141 
Niche blogs and other Internet sources offset this phenomenon but only 
partially. The Internet’s effectiveness as a tool to disseminate relevant political 
information is undermined by an echo-chamber effect.142 Those with intense 
interest have better access to information than ever before, but those who do 
not seek out news are even more likely to miss it.143 
B. Unconnected and Disempowered: Organizations Without  
an Associational Life 
The chain of political accountability has also been weakened by the trans-
formation of civic associations, including political parties, in the United States 
since the 1970s and its negative effect on both political participation and in-
formation. Market incentives to provide useful political information have dis-
appeared at precisely the same time that the organizations that might have off-
set the collective action problem voters face in obtaining information have also 
weakened.144 This makes the votes of even those who do turnout less powerful. 
Ordinary voters are increasingly politically disconnected from one anoth-
er in ways that undermine their political power.145 Indeed, the solicitude of 
government officials to the preferences of wealthy citizens has been attributed 
to the increasing organizational advantage of socioeconomic elites compared 
                                                                                                                           
(2009) (suggesting that the relatively moderate politics of Fresno County, California may well be a 
product of the fact that the newspapers in the area have “unusually high-quality political coverage,” 
regularly including actions taken by individual city councilmembers). 
 141 Kristine Lu & Jesse Holcomb, In 21 States, Local Newspapers Lack a Dedicated D.C. Report-
er Covering Congress, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/
01/07/in-21-states-local-newspapers-lack-a-dedicated-reporter-keeping-tabs-on-congress/ [https://
perma.cc/6FD3-BDDV]. 
 142 See generally Karen Mossberger & Caroline J. Tolbert, Digital Democracy: How Politics 
Online Is Changing Electoral Participation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 
AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 200 (Jan. E. Leighley ed., 2010) (reviewing the existing research, includ-
ing that which shows internet users to be better informed than average voters and online activity to be 
a motivator for moderately interested citizens, while noting significant limitations, including the digi-
tal divide). 
 143 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 156 (arguing that the Internet has “divid[ed] the media 
audience into a hardy band of news junkies and a much larger pool of entertainment addicts” with the 
result that “the best-informed citizens are better informed than ever, [but] more and more citizens are 
consuming less and less news”). 
 144 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 8 (noting that middle-of-the-road voters have lost 
access to “the old sources of information, like traditional news organizations, widespread voluntary 
organizations, and locally grounded political parties”). 
 145 See SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 12–18, 232–40; see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
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to the middle class.146 Since the 1970s, union membership has dramatically 
dropped, especially among private-sector workers, while class-integrated, 
mass-membership voluntary organizations have faded in importance.147 As a 
result, today “lower-income Americans are only about a third as likely as the 
affluent to belong to an organization that takes a stand on public issues.”148 
The unions and voluntary organizations that dominated civil society in the 
middle of the twentieth century importantly leveraged the power of ordinary 
citizens to control their elected representatives. They did so by providing 
members with organizational skills, political knowledge and, perhaps most 
importantly, social ties that drew them further into political life when oppor-
tunity called, including on Election Day.149 Unions, during the New Deal for 
instance, “brought workers into sustained engagement with politics, often for 
the first time.”150 They “helped members identify common issues of concern, 
informed those members about politics and policy, and pressed those members’ 
demands in political debates.”151 They also “launch[ed] voter registration 
drives, and involv[ed] union households in canvasing and mobilization within 
their communities.”152 
Voluntary associations during the same period similarly empowered the 
electorate, despite the fact that they were organized around nonpolitical inter-
ests. Their federated structure combined with the significant social ties among 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Cf. APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 657 (noting that the weakening of unions has coincid-
ed with the consolidation of socioeconomic elites’ capacity to “speak loudly and clearly to govern-
ment officials”). At this point, it is worth returning to Kathleen Bawn and her colleagues’ continued 
skepticism about the electorate as a source of democratic accountability. Although Bawn and her 
colleagues share skepticism about the median voter theorem, they conclude that voters are incapable 
of staying informed. This finding, however, may well be related to the fact that they do not consider 
the relevance of changes in the organizational capacity of the electorate during the period that their 
data covers. 
 147 Id. at 657, 662 (noting that “since the 1970s, the proportion of the work force that is union-
ized” has fallen from about 50% to 12.9% and that the hardest hit have been private sector unions 
where union membership has fallen to 8.2%). 
 148 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 115. 
 149 See Theda Skocpol, Government Activism and the Reorganization of American Civic Democ-
racy, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF 
CONSERVATISM 39, 41–42, 57–59 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007) (noting, among other 
things, that social ties at the local level ensured that members eagerly “participat[ed] in statewide or 
national [political] campaigns”). 
 150 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 140. 
 151 Id.; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 115 (noting that “[a]t the height of the 
post-New Deal party system of the 1950s and 1960s, a powerful network of organizations, integrated 
with a locally rooted Democratic Party structure, represented middle-income Americans on pocket-
book matters”) (emphasis added). 
 152 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 140. 
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members of different socioeconomic classes enabled them to be exceedingly 
effective empowered ordinary Americans.153 
The political importance of these groups was particularly noticeable on 
Election Day. If there is one thing known about getting out the vote, it is that 
“people are more likely to turn out to vote in response to face-to-face appeals,” 
and this is even truer if the person making the appeal is someone one knows 
personally.154 In fact, it is the friends that one knows through civic groups 
whose requests to take political action are most likely to be accepted.155 Un-
ions, not surprisingly, were exceedingly effective at getting out the vote: 
[L]abor’s biggest contribution to elections was not in dollars but in 
volunteers and voters. Union members engaged in voter mobiliza-
tion on a scale previously unknown in national politics. In the razor-
tight presidential contest of 1960, union members distributed ten 
million leaflets on congressional voting records and five million cir-
culars comparing Kennedy’s and Nixon’s records on labor issues.156 
Even today, union households turnout at higher rates than others.157 
In sum, the civic associations that dominated through the 1970s served as 
important counterweights to elite interests.158 They did not simply get out the 
vote on Election Day. They got things done. The enactment of some of the 
most important national policies, reflecting the interests of the middle class, 
can be attributed to these organizations. Labor unions, with their vast network 
of members, made possible the passage of Social Security, Medicare, and key 
civil rights statutes.159 The G.I. Bill was the outgrowth of the efforts of the 
American Legion, a grassroots veterans’ organization with local chapters 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Skocpol, supra note 149, at 59 (noting, in particular, that social ties at the local level ensured 
that members eagerly “participat[ed] in statewide or national [political] campaigns”). 
 154 Id. at 58 (noting, among other things, that such organizations “conveyed politically relevant 
knowledge and motivation” and drew voters out on Election Day because of the personal relationships 
they provided); see DONALD P. GREEN & ALAN S. GERBER, GET OUT THE VOTE! HOW TO INCREASE 
VOTER TURNOUT 34–40, 77–79, 94 tbl. 8-1, 94–95 (2004) (comparing the effectiveness of different 
get-out-the-vote strategies and finding that those involving personal contacts (door-to-door canvassing 
or friendly phone banks) are the most effective). 
 155 Abu El-Haj, supra note 14, at 81 (reviewing a study that found “Americans are more likely to 
be asked to engage in political activity by friends they know through civic associations than by any 
other friends they have” and that such requests are also the most likely to receive an acceptance). 
 156 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 141. 
 157 See Richard B. Freeman, What, Me Vote?, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 703, 714 (Kathryn M. 
Neckerman ed., 2004) (noting that “[u]nion members have about a four-percentage-point higher prob-
ability of voting than non-members”). 
 158 See generally Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 183–85 (reviewing literature). 
 159 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 139–43; see also Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 186–88 
(explaining how such programs benefit the middle class). 
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throughout the nation that mobilized its members in various ways.160 Moreo-
ver, the civic and political experiences these groups provided for ordinary 
Americans reinforced political skills, knowledge, and commitments to civic 
and political participation among members.161 
No longer structured as mass-membership organizations with many local, 
class-integrated chapters that meet in person in small groups, the civic associa-
tions that exist today are not well positioned to hold elected officials accounta-
ble. Professionally managed and foundation funded, contemporary associations 
typically “deploy money and ideas to influence public affairs.”162 That is, they 
are largely structured to represent viewpoints rather than foster active demo-
cratic membership.163 They do not seek to promote broad electoral participa-
tion, depending instead on litigation and lobbying to achieve their goals.164 
Membership, where it exists, is largely passive and impersonal, consisting of 
sending an annual check and putting a sticker on one’s car.165 Moreover, their 
membership is typically unrepresentative of the electorate.166 
C. Reorganizing the Electorate: A Role for Reform-Minded Lawyers 
A clear lesson to be drawn from the literature is that the inability of ordi-
nary Americans to hold elected officials accountable to their preferences re-
sults from the fact that they are increasingly disorganized. The weaknesses of 
contemporary civic institutions make it difficult to mobilize politically, even 
when civic and political consciousness runs high.167 From the perspective of 
                                                                                                                           
 160 GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, THE GI BILL: A NEW DEAL FOR VETERANS 
51–61 (2009); Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 183–85. 
 161 See generally Abu El-Haj, supra note 14, at 76–88 (reviewing social science literature on the 
trajectory from social forays to politics). 
 162 SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 229–30 (noting that foundation-funding has, among other things, 
meant organizations have less incentive to mobilize broad constituencies or to allow members to par-
ticipate in organization decision-making); Skocpol, supra note 149, at 43. 
 163 See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 120 (noting that “narrower issue organizations that are 
more dependent on foundation funding and wealthy donors” have come to dominate civil society). 
 164 Id. (explaining the lack of attention to broad mobilization); see also Skocpol, supra note 149, 
at 40, 42–54, 58–59 (discussing the rise of contemporary civic associations in relation to federal poli-
cy and noting that although contemporary civic groups are more inclusive than they were in the past, 
they are less interested in mobilizing the electorate). 
 165 See Debra C. Minkoff, Producing Social Capital: National Social Movements and Civil Socie-
ty, in BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATE IN CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 186 (noting that “members [in contemporary national civic associa-
tions] are linked to the organization and to each other through financial contributions” and that 
“[a]ttendance at meetings is rare”). 
 166 Accord SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 232–36; see HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 195–
96 (remarking that these organizations tend to focus on “cultural issues [that] are [both] easier to un-
derstand” and “resonate with highly educated and better-off voters”). 
 167 SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 246–53 (noting the ways in which renewed popular civic and 
political impulses had no place to go in the wake of 9/11 as compared to prior wars). 
1158 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1127 
democratic accountability, the critical feature missing in the vast majority of 
civic associations today is active membership and class-integrated, personal 
ties.168 The absence of these features is what undermines the ability of such 
organizations to generate political activity, including voting, and to effectively 
disseminate relevant political information to ordinary Americans. 
The clear implication is that resources must be devoted to fostering the 
emergence of civic associations capable of encouraging electoral participation 
and of providing voters with useful, substantive information about politics and 
policies.169 Civic organizations with strong personal infrastructures would also 
be in a better position to unleash the full potential of the Internet insofar as 
information is best disseminated through social networks.170 
The goal of regenerating civic associations based on social ties should not 
be mistaken for either a call to recreate the associational life of the mid-
twentieth century or to fund only local civic associations. The objective would 
be to promote twenty-first century civic organizations, social and political, that 
combine the watchdog and lobbying functions of elite public interest organiza-
tions with a network of smaller chapters capable of effectively harnessing per-
sonal ties, whether strong or weak, embodied or virtual, into political interest 
and action, including voting on election days. Models of this approach already 
exist in the National Rifle Association and the Sierra Club, which have worked 
to integrate a D.C.-based, lobbying-focused national center with a network of 
local clubs, where members meet in person, often undertaking civic and politi-
cal work, including getting out the vote.171 
There are plenty of reasons to believe this is both possible and that the 
current coalition of campaign reformers could have a critical role to play. The 
robust associational life of the mid-twentieth century was not simply fortui-
tous. It was importantly a byproduct of the form national policymaking took 
during the period. The welfare state provided economic security but, equally 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Skocpol, supra note 149, at 221–53. 
 169 Cf. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 138–39 (arguing that organizations “can serve as . . . 
essential conduit[s] for effective citizen action” and counteract the political advantages of the 
wealthy). 
 170 Abu El-Haj, supra note 14, at 59, 94–95 (reviewing literature suggesting that information is 
best disseminated through social networks and thus that the political potential of the Internet depends 
on the underlying relationships between those using social media as part of their political efforts). 
 171 See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 157, 266–71; Skocpol, supra note 149, at 45 (dis-
cussing the organizational structure of the National Rifle Association and the National Right to Life 
Committee). One potential problem with this hybrid model, however, is that there may be tensions 
between the interests of the D.C.-based lobbying organizations and the local chapters or constituents. 
Cf. Alan Berlow, Opinion, Who the N.R.A. Really Speaks for, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6., 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/opinion/who-the-nra-really-speaks-for.html [https://perma.cc/8RND-
Q69Q] (noting that a 2012 poll found that 87% of gun owners support criminal background checks, a 
policy thwarted by the National Rifle Association). 
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important, gave citizens reasons to be invested in national policy and “stimu-
lated the growth of organizations that recruited people into politics.”172 
The political capacity of ordinary Americans has been significantly un-
dermined by the unintended consequences of the dismantling of the welfare 
state since the 1980s.173 The political power of senior citizens illustrates the 
critical ways government policies can either enhance or diminish civic and 
political engagement.174 Unlike any other group in American society, older 
Americans not only vote in higher percentages than the rest of the public, but 
they also vote at high rates regardless of their socioeconomic background.175 
The enhanced political engagement of America’s seniors has tangible political 
consequences. Well-organized by the AARP, the current beneficiaries of Social 
Security are among the few citizens who have successfully held off the prefer-
ences of moneyed elites, specifically privatizing Social Security.176 Both the 
atypical participation and atypical political success are as much a product of 
the fact that Social Security has not been scaled back—unlike welfare benefits 
and subsidies for higher education—as of the great civic experience that was 
World War II.177 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 111. 
 173 This is not meant to deny that market forces explain some of the changes in American associa-
tional life, including the media’s incentives to report on politics and the narrowing of private-sector 
unionism. 
 174 See generally Mettler & Soss, supra note 61, passim (arguing that political science needs to 
attend more systematically to the ways in which public policy can enhance or undermine civic groups 
and political participation). One study has shown, for example, how the beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill 
were more likely to become civically and politically active later in life and that was not simply a by-
product of raised educational levels. Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engage-
ment: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 351, 
357 (2002) (finding positive effect on both civic and political participation that cannot be reduced to 
socioeconomic background); see also Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 157 (reviewing literature that 
found “[p]rogram design . . . profoundly influence[s] political resources, conceptions of citizenship, 
definitions of interest, and assessment of efficacy,” all of which affect political and electoral engage-
ment). 
 175 Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 189 (noting that “not only are levels of participation among the 
aged remarkably high . . . the aged are the one group for which a marked participatory bias favoring 
the affluent and educated does not exist”). For a key study in this regard, see generally ANDREA 
LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERI-
CAN WELFARE STATE (2003). 
 176 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 77–79; see also Gilens, supra note 26, at 248, 272–
74 (arguing generally that it is the presence of powerful interest groups’ allies that explains instances 
in which social welfare policy, consistent with the preferences of lower and middle class Americans, 
prevails over those of the affluent but acknowledging that the exception may be the AARP, which “as 
a mass membership organization[] might actually be considered a conduit through which the influence 
of less well-off Americans flows”). 
 177 See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 112–15 (noting that since the late 1970s “social policies 
directed at non-elderly, nondisabled citizens in the lower half of the income distribution” as well as 
college-bound youth “have changed in ways that have worked to reverse their civic and political in-
corporation”); see also Suzanne Mettler, The Transformed Welfare State and the Redistribution of 
Political Voice, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND 
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The lesson to be learned is that governments can choose to distribute re-
sources in ways that “stimulate political organizations, solidarity, and account-
ability, or they may foster atomized publics with little sense of what they have 
in common and [what is] at stake in politics and government.”178 Tax deduc-
tions, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit or the home mortgage interest 
deduction, may have a range of benefits as a regulatory mechanism, but a ma-
jor cost associated with them is that they discourage the politicization of the 
citizens they favor and disfavor.179 This is because tax deductions and credits 
disguise the fact that the government is providing a benefit, while at the same 
time “provid[ing it] . . . on an individualized basis.”180 
Public policies that acknowledge that they are benefiting certain classes 
of individuals, by contrast, create groups that have an incentive to organize and 
mobilize politically.181Equally important, the political parties will have an in-
centive to target them for mobilization, amplifying their interests still fur-
ther.182 Insofar as lawyers, including legal academics, often play an important 
role in analyzing the costs and benefits of different regulatory approaches, it is 
                                                                                                                           
THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 191, 204–12, supra note 149 (arguing that retrenchments in the welfare 
state has produced lower levels of voting among lower income Americans both because they are less 
well organized by civic groups and because political parties no longer feel the need to mobilize them). 
 178 Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 110. 
 179 For a thorough analysis of the political consequences of the “submerged state,” including the 
ways that, at the same time that it obscures benefits and harms to ordinary citizens, it frequently cre-
ates powerful vested interests, such as realtors and private student loan lenders, with incentives to 
increase their political capacity, see Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Chal-
lenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 808–09, 809 tbl. 3 (2010) 
(noting significant discrepancies between respondents’ answers to the general question of whether 
they had “ever used a government social program, or not” as compared to the six policies of the sub-
merged state—529 College Savings Plan or Coverdell Education Savings Account; Home Mortgage 
Interest Deduction; Hope or Lifetime Learning Tax Credit; Student Loans; Child and Dependent Care 
Tax Credit; Earned Income Tax Credit). 
 180 Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 113; see also Mettler & Soss, supra note 61, at 60–64 (arguing 
that the critical issue is how benefits are distributed, in particular, whether they are “visible versus 
hidden, targeted versus universal, obligations-oriented versus rights-oriented, participatory versus 
nonparticipatory, supervisory versus distant, generous versus stingy, privately provided versus public 
provided”). 
 181 Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 181–82 (reviewing literature showing that “recipients of bene-
fits are sought after in mobilization efforts by political parties and interest groups, thus amplifying 
their voice in the political process”). 
 182 Programs that are perceived as helpful are particularly efficacious in this regard. Id. at 182 
(noting these differences in effects in a study comparing recipients’ positive experience of Social 
Security Disability Insurance with recipients’ negative experiences of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children); see also Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 113–14 (explaining further how government poli-
tics that are experienced as punitive or paternalistic—such as U.S. drug policy and the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families—are likely to undermine civic participation because those on the re-
ceiving end are unlikely to experience government as the source of potential benefits). 
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time for progressive-minded election lawyers to draw attention to the collateral 
consequences on civic associations of certain regulatory modes.183 
Government benefits are not the only ways law shapes American civic as-
sociations. The tax code also could be used more carefully to incentivize or-
ganizing as a membership-based civic association. Precise reform proposals 
are beyond the scope of this Article. It is easily arguable, however, that organ-
izing tax-breaks (including non-profit status) around a combination of the size 
of membership and the internal structure of the organization—with the most 
tax benefits going to those that have subchapters, regularly hold conferences 
for members, or rely on volunteers—rather than around the purposes of an or-
ganization would make a difference. Similarly, the tax code could incentivize 
active membership over charitable contributions by allowing individuals to 
deduct the value of the time they contributed to social welfare groups, as is 
done with personal property donations. The deductions available for certain 
types of membership dues, including to professional associations, could be 
expanded. For example, if a campaign voucher program were ever adopted, it 
could be structured to be used not just for campaign contributions, but also to 
pay for debate watching parties or other social political events. 
Foundations would do well to attend to the second-order costs associated 
with funding elite D.C.-based public interest organizations. To the degree pri-
vate foundations fund civic groups, they might consider making funds contin-
gent upon implementing strategies that encourage active membership or col-
laborations with membership-based community organizations. 
Finally, this lens enables one to see that the most imminent contemporary 
threats to further disempowering the electorate come from the Supreme Court 
and its misguided First Amendment jurisprudence. Although the First Amend-
ment poses a formidable barrier to effective legislative efforts to curb the in-
fluence of moneyed elites, it need not affirmatively undermine the political 
power of ordinary Americans. Two salient lines of First Amendment doctrine, 
however, are poised to do just that. First, while unionism is already under at-
tack from right-to-work legislation adopted in twenty-five states, there is some 
reason to fear that the Supreme Court is inclined to strike down the laws of 
those states that promote unionism through statutes that require nonunion 
members to contribute their fair share to the cost of the union’s collective bar-
gaining efforts.184 Second, the rise of single candidate-focused Super PACs, 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Cf. Mettler & Soss, supra note 61, at 60–64 (arguing that policy research needs to pay system-
atic attention to the ways policies affect the political process, including building and undermining the 
public’s capacity to mobilize politically). 
 184 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, By Undermining Unions, The Roberts Court Will Do Still More 
Damage to Our Democracy, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 15, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/12/by-
undermining-unions-roberts-court.html [https://perma.cc/HFD3-8DR8]. See generally Friedrichs v. 
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another creature of the evolution of First Amendment doctrine since Citizens 
United, has accelerated the transformation of political parties from the federat-
ed, membership organization they once were into an elite, D.C.-based, super-
interest group.185 The problem arises because single-candidate Super PACs are 
increasingly taking over the task of mobilizing voters but are doing so without 
the associational life that bred the positive returns of high-voter turnout and 
engaged electorates.186 Most Super PACs are like tertiary associations on ster-
oids, paying employees to undertake tasks traditionally performed voluntarily 
by the party faithful.187 Like other D.C.-based elite interest groups, they tend to 
be beholden to their primary donors and to rely on hired professionals rather 
than volunteers. Fewer volunteers likely will result in fewer party activists. 
Worse still, it leads to fewer politically engaged friends and neighbors that or-
dinary voters know who might encourage them to get out to vote or keep them 
abreast of the stakes in various elections and policy debates. 
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY AND A REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORATE 
Empowering the electorate must go hand in hand with its expansion. En-
hanced democratic accountability will require increasing the representativeness 
of the electorate that turns out to vote on election days, particularly for party 
primaries. The contemporary electorate is narrow and unrepresentative in ways 
that further enhance the political influence of moneyed elites. The problem is 
most acute in party primaries. 
                                                                                                                           
Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 
1083 (2016). 
 185 Although the debate about Super PACs is sometimes framed as a choice between political 
parties and outsider political associations, this is a mistake. As Joseph Fishkin and Heather K. Gerken 
explained, Super PACs, run as they are by party insiders, are best understood as part of the party net-
work, and the struggles between Super PACs and the formal party should be conceptualized as an 
intraparty conflict. Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow 
Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178, 186–90 [hereinafter Fish-
kin & Gerken, The Party’s Over] (explaining why “[w]hat we are witnessing is not outside spenders 
pulling power away from the parties but an intraparty battle for the heart and soul of the party writ 
large”); Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends that Matter for Party Politics, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 32 (2014), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/
pdf/nyulawreviewonline-89-32-fishkin-gerken.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J93-3YQB] (arguing that Super 
PACs function as shadow parties—“nominally independent groups . . . run by major party insiders . . . 
that perform functions that in the past were performed directly by the parties”) (emphasis added). 
 186 Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 185, at 176–77 (noting that Super PACs 
increasingly pay employees to undertake tasks traditionally performed voluntarily by the party faith-
ful, including voter mobilization, message testing, organizing donors, and maintaining voter data-
bases). 
 187 But see Peter Overby, Koch Political Network Takes a Deep Dive into Community Organizing, 
NPR (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/12/447911161/koch-political-network-takes-a-
deep-dive-into-community-organizing [https://perma.cc/VDS5-MMY2]. 
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A. The Primary Electorate: A Formidable Unrepresentative Master 
Party primaries today drive a wedge between elected officials and their 
constituents by tying elected officials’ political careers to the preferences of the 
party’s base, including to the preferences of wealthy donors capable of funding 
a primary challenge.188 Low and unrepresentative turnout during party prima-
ries creates an opportunity for those most active in politics to exercise substan-
tial influence over elected officials. This dynamic is significantly enhanced by 
the rise in uncompetitive general elections.189 
Although it is common knowledge that voter turnout is low during party 
primaries, just how low might come as a surprise to some. In 2014, Eric Cantor 
lost in a primary in which 13.7% of registered voters participated—a figure at 
least three percentage points higher than any primary in Virginia since 2006.190 
In Delaware that year, turnout in the Democratic primary was reported at 7% 
for statewide offices.191 The 2015 mayoral race in Philadelphia was effectively 
determined by the 27% of registered voters who turned out for the primary 
election.192 
Systematic data on turnout for off-cycle, down-ballot primaries are sur-
prisingly difficult to come by. By some estimates, the average percentage of 
the voting age population (“VAP”) participating in contested House primaries 
between 1972 and 2000 hovered between 8.1% and 11.7%.193 Data from 2010 
indicates that even when there is a competitive Senate race, turnout for party 
                                                                                                                           
 188 MASKET, supra note 140, at 191 (noting that the inherent tension “between satisfying the 
moderate voters of the general election and pleasing” the informal party organization that controls the 
party primaries—both ideological activists and “benefit seekers”—“has largely been resolved in favor 
of the latter”). 
 189 See id. at 7–10. 
 190 Philip Bump, Eric Cantor Didn’t Lose Because of Low Turnout, He Lost Because Turnout 
Was So High, WASH. POST (June 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/
06/12/cantor-didnt-lose-because-of-low-turnout-he-lost-because-turnout-was-so-high/ [https://perma.
cc/87RT-UB42]. Note this turnout figure is for registered voters as opposed to the voting eligible 
population. 
 191 State of Delaware: Primary Election (Official Results), DELAWARE.GOV, http://elections.
delaware.gov/archive/elect14/elect14_Primary/html/election.shtml [https://perma.cc/3QB5-CWLZ] 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2016). 
 192 Aaron Moselle, Just 27 Percent of Philly’s Registered Voters Turn Out for Primary, NEWS-
WORKS (May 20, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/politics/82190-just-27-percent-
of-phillys-registered-voters-turn-out-for-primary [https://perma.cc/68VX-568T]. Note this turnout 
figure, again, is for registered voters as opposed to the voting eligible population. Moreover, Philadel-
phia’s mayoral seat is safe for the Democratic Party. As such, even this figure overestimates the num-
ber of voters that matter insofar as it includes voters who participated in the Republican primary. 
 193 Nolan M. McCarty, The Limits of Electoral and Legislative Reform in Addressing Polariza-
tion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 359, 365, 367 (2011). 
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primaries is below 25% of the Voting Eligible Population (“VEP”)—the gener-
ally preferred statistic among political scientists (see Table 1). 194 
 
Table 1: Primary Compared to General Election Turnout Rates for  
Competitive Senate Seats in 2010 
  Senate Primary General Election 
California 21% 44% 
Colorado 21% 51% 
Connecticut 5% 46% 
Illinois 19% 42% 
Kentucky 27% 42% 
Nevada 17% 41% 
Pennsylvania 20% 42% 
Washington 31% 54% 
West Virginia 10% 37% 
Wisconsin 20% 52% 
 
 Even states with generally high turnout, experience low turnout during 
off-cycle party primaries (see Table 2). In 2010, in Iowa, Colorado, Wisconsin, 
and New Hampshire—chosen because they are generally high turnout states—
voter turnout for the U.S. Senate primary was 12%, 21.3%, 19.7% and 18.9% 
of the VEP respectively (compared to during the general election when it was 
49.9%, 50.6%, 52% and 45.7%). 
 
 
Table 2: 2010 Off Cycle Election: Primary Compared to General Election 
Turnout Rates 
Typically High Turnout States 
  Senate Primary General Election 
Colorado* 21.3% 50.6% 
Iowa 12.0% 49.9% 
New Hampshire 18.9% 45.7% 
Wisconsin* 19.7% 52.0% 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Unless otherwise indicated, all statistics in Part IV can be found at www.electproject.org and 
refer to the percentage of VEP that turned out. For the identification of competitive Senate seats in 
2010, see VANDEWALKER, supra note 82, at 17 n.9. 
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Typically Average to Low Turnout States 
  Senate Primary General Election 
Arizona 21.1% 41.0% 
California* 21.1% 44.0% 
Florida 16.8% 41.7% 
North Carolina 14.1% 39.2% 
* Competitive Senate seat. 
 
Turnout for presidential primaries, at least when they are competitive, is 
generally higher. Presidential primary turnout typically drops when an incum-
bent President is running for reelection. The following graphic from the Pew 
Research Center charts changes in turnout as a percentage of estimated VAP, 
while disaggregating turnout for each of the two-major parties’ primaries:195 
                                                                                                                           
 195 Drew DeSilver, So Far, Turnout in This Year’s Primaries Rivals 2008 Record, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/08/so-far-turnout-in-this-years-primaries-
rivals-2008-record/ [https://perma.cc/RCU5-XLSE]. 
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The critically important fact for reformers, however, is that primary voter 
turnout varies significantly by state. As Table 3 shows, in 2000, turnout for the 
presidential primary was highest in New Hampshire and California, where 
44.4% and 40.3% of the VEP turned out, respectively. In most states, however, 
turnout was much lower. In Texas, only 15.4% of the VEP turned out. Turnout 
in Florida, a swing state, was 12.7%. This meant that in 2010, three times as 
many voters turned out for the general election in Texas while more than four 
times as many voters turned out in Florida. Ohio, another swing state that year, 
did only a little better at 30.6%. In New Jersey, which held the last primary of 
the season, only 4.4% of the VEP turned out, despite its not insignificant fif-
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teen Electoral College votes. In 2004, while California’s turnout for the general 
election was only modestly higher than for the party primary, in New Hamp-
shire and Ohio, turnout for the general election more than doubled that of the 
party primary. In Texas, turnout for the general election nearly quintupled, and 
in Delaware, it increased by a factor of more than ten. 
 
Table 3: Turnout Key States for Presidential Primaries 
State 2000* 2004 2008* 2012 
 
Primary General Primary General Primary General Primary General 
New 
Hampshire 44.4 63.9 29.9 70.9 53.6 71.7 31.1 70.2 
California 40.3 55.7 31 58.8 40 60.9 22.9 55.1 
Texas 15.4 49.2 11 53.7 28.4 54.1 12.8 49.6 
Florida 12.7 55.9 
No 
data 64.4 34 66.1 12.8 62.8 
Ohio 30.6 56.7 28.2 66.8 42.4 66.9 14 64.5 
New Jersey 4.4 56.9 
No 
data 63.8 29.2 67 8.8 61.5 
Delaware 
No 
data 59 5.6 64.2 23.8 65.6 4.3 62.4 
New York 25.4 55.1 
No 
data 58 19.5 59 1.4 53.1 
* Years when both Democratic and Republican presidential nominations were contested. 
 
The variability in presidential primary turnout by state has also been evi-
dent in the 2016 cycle (see Table 4).196 
 
Table 4: 2016 Presidential Caucus & Primary Turnout 
Iowa*+ 15.7% 
New Hampshire+ 52.4% 
Alabama 35.0% 
Arkansas 30.2% 
Georgia+ 29.9% 
Massachusetts+ 37.4% 
Minnesota*+ 8.1% 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Figures in this chart, which includes only states that had a single primary election day for both 
parties, refer to the percentage of VEP. Statistics are from 2016 Presidential Nomination Contest 
Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/2016P [https://perma.cc/3U5B-
6FUR]. Information about the primary schedule for each state are from Ballotpedia:Calendar, BAL-
LOTPEDIA.ORG, https://ballotpedia.org/Ballotpedia:Calendar [https://perma.cc/4LAN-XD9N] (last 
visited August 23, 2016). 
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Oklahoma+ 28.6% 
Tennessee+ 25.3% 
Texas 24.7% 
Vermont+ 39.8% 
Virginia+ 30.1% 
Kansas*+ 5.5% 
Louisiana+ 18.2% 
Michigan+ 34.1% 
Mississippi 29.5% 
Florida+ 28.2% 
Illinois 38.9% 
Missouri+ 34.8% 
North Carolina++ 31.6% 
Ohio 37.5% 
Arizona+ 23.5% 
Utah*+ 14.3% 
Wisconsin+ 49.4% 
New York+ 21.2% 
Connecticut+ 21.0% 
Delaware+ 23.5% 
Maryland 32.8% 
Pennsylvania 33.7% 
Rhodes Island+ 23.6% 
Indiana 36.0% 
West Virginia 31.1% 
Oregon 36.0% 
California 34.0% 
Montana 35.5% 
New Jersey 20.4% 
New Mexico 22.6% 
South Dakota 19.9% 
* Caucus 
+ Presidential primary only 
++ Presidential and state primary (congressional primary held separately) 
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The primary effect of low and unrepresentative turnout in presidential 
primaries is in uncompetitive down-ballot elections. Take Texas and New Jer-
sey, for example: in 2016, fewer than 24.7% of Texans and 20.4% of New Jer-
sey voters will have determined who was elected in a safe seat in which there 
was a contested primary. Turnout in any given political party’s nomination 
event is even lower as the graphic from the Pew Research Center (above) 
makes clear. In 2012, the highest turnout in a Republican primary was: 24.9% 
in New Hampshire, 17.7% in Alabama, and 18.7% in Wisconsin; the lowest, 
Virginia and the District of Columbia at 4.6% and 1.1%, respectively.197 
Turnout for down-ballot primaries is often even lower in states that hold 
separate primaries for other offices.198 While turnout for the presidential prima-
ry in Wisconsin reached a respectable 49% of the VEP, only 16.2% of regis-
tered voters cast a ballot in the contested Republican primary for Wisconsin’s 
first congressional district—the seat held by House Majority leader Paul 
Ryan.199 
 In a world of safe districts, the low turnout for party primaries provides 
a significant opportunity for those who are highly politically motivated, includ-
ing moneyed elites, to exercise outsized influence on politicians. For most 
elected offices, the party primary is the decisive election.200 The preferences of 
                                                                                                                           
 197 Nate Silver, Nevada May Show Trump Can Win Even with Low Turnout, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Feb. 23, 2016, 5:38 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/nevada-may-show-trump-can-win-even-
with-low-turnout/ [https://perma.cc/W4AP-55GA] (providing the statistics in this paragraph). 
 198 See, e.g., Nick Viviani, Associated Press, Turnout in Kansas Primary Appears as Expected, 
WIBW (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.wibw.com/content/news/Turnout-in-Kansas-primary-appears-as-
expected-389006822.html [https://perma.cc/7GBH-HRS3] (estimating somewhere around 20–25% of 
registered voters had come out to vote); Matthew Hamilton, Congressional Primary Turnout Was 
Average—and Underwhelming, TIMESUNION (June 29, 2016), http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/
archives/264809/congressional-primary-turnout-was-average-and-underwhelming/ [https://perma.cc/
8HNA-8EC5] (characterizing turnout rates of 11 % of registered voters (approximately 30,000 voters) 
as about average in New York congressional districts). Members of Congress from Kansas and New 
York represent about 725,000 constituents each. See Fast Facts for Congress, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/fastfacts/ [https://perma.cc/Y5J2-D9UM]. 
 199 The seat is safe for the Republican Party but Paul Ryan faced a primary challenge from a sup-
porter of Donald Trump. See Alex Swoyer, Paul Nehlen Challenges Paul Ryan: “Dangerous” to Deny 
“The Will of Voters,” BREITBART.COM (May 15, 2016) http://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidential-
race/2016/05/15/paul-nehlen-challenges-paul-ryan-dangerous-highest-ranking-republican-deny-will-
voters/ [https://perma.cc/9HBY-TP79]. For turnout and registration statistics, see Elections & Voting 
Statistics, WIS. ELECTIONS AND ETHICS COMM’N, http://www.gab.wi.gov/elections-voting/statistics 
[https://perma.cc/7CSL-S8WL]. 
 200 See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARI-
ZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 97–103 (2010) (illustrating that more and more elections are 
safe for one party or another at both state and national level, including electoral college votes). Alt-
hough this is often attributed to partisan gerrymandering during periodic constitutionally required 
redistricting, the problem is not limited to such situations. Accord Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center 
Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 307–15 
(2011) (summarizing empirical debate). Even Senate seats are often uncompetitive because of the 
sheer cost of running a successful senatorial bid. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 125–26. 
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such primary voters, however, are infamously unrepresentative of the general 
electorate’s.201 
 Elected officials quickly calculate that their most important constituen-
cy is the electorate that turns out for the party primary. A shoe-in at the general, 
incumbents fear the wrath of the better-informed and more ideologically ex-
treme primary electorate than that of the general electorate.202 Their principle 
aim becomes to avoid provoking a well-funded primary challenge.203 
In sum, although state-run party primaries were adopted “to democratize 
the political parties and to take power away from party bosses and elites,” low 
voter turnout during party primaries in safe districts undermines this goal, giv-
ing form to a new party boss—the party base.204 Moneyed elites know this and 
are often key to nominations while holding the threat of a primary challenge in 
their hands as well.205 The mere threat of a primary challenge can make in-
cumbent politicians cast votes that they know are at odds with the views of the 
public and their constituents.206 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Accord Pildes, supra note 200, at 298 (summarizing the consensus that “[a]s low turnout 
events, primaries tend to be dominated by the most committed and active party members, who tend to 
be more ideologically extreme than the average party member”); see, e.g., Seth J. Hill, Institution of 
Nomination and the Policy Ideology of Primary Electorates, 10 Q. J. POL. SCI. 461, 474 (2015) (find-
ing that “primary electorates are less centrist than general electorates in every House district,” includ-
ing as compared to general electorate voters from their own party in both contested and safe districts, 
on basis of data comparing policy views of voters who actually turned out in primary and general 
elections for House races). 
 202 See, e.g., David W. Brady et al., Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with 
the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEG. STUD. Q. 79, 82 (2007) (analyzing primary election returns from 
1956 to 1998 and finding “that congressional candidates, like their presidential counterparts, are 
forced to please their primary-election constituency by positioning themselves away from the median 
voter”); accord Pildes, supra note 200, at 308–09 (describing the dynamics). But see Shigeo Hirano et 
al., Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 5 Q. J. POL. SCI. 169, 173 
(2010) (claiming to have undermined this conventional wisdom based on a seven state study focused 
almost entirely on Senate rather than House elections). 
 203 Cf. Brady et al., supra note 202, at 88–90, 96–98 (finding that “Democrats who are conserva-
tive and Republicans who are liberal relative to their districts are significantly more likely to draw 
primary opposition” and arguing that the dramatic drop in the number of successful primary challeng-
es after 1970 is, importantly, evidence that incumbents learned that their true master is the primary 
electorate in the wake of significant defeats of incumbents by organized interests). 
 204 CAIN, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that party primaries are only democratizing “if the electorate 
as a whole participates”). 
 205 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 122; accord MASKET, supra note 140, at 14–16; see 
also id. at 126–27 (offering examples where moderate Republicans were forced out of office by a 
conservative party base that did not appreciate instances of cooperation with Democrats). 
 206 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 41, at 73–74 (explaining how pressure generated by con-
servative talk shows and funders led House Republicans to vote for impeaching President Clinton 
despite polls showing overwhelming public opposition to the move (68% on the day the House vot-
ed)); accord MASKET, supra note 140, at 2. 
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B. The General Electorate: A Weak Counterweight 
The contemporary general electorate is narrow and unrepresentative in 
ways that further enhances the political influence of moneyed elites. 
Overrepresentation of socioeconomic elites in the general electorate narrows 
the gap between the views of the active electorate and those of moneyed inter-
ests. Elected officials answerable to a more representative electorate, especial-
ly in competitive districts, would have stronger reasons to resist the policy pull 
of moneyed interests, especially on economic issues. 
Even in a world in which moneyed elites have outsized political influ-
ence, elected officials do pay consideration to attentive constituencies.207 A 
recent study of federal discretionary spending, for example, reveals that when 
elected officials secure federal largesse for their districts, they specifically al-
locate those dollars to the geographic areas with the highest voter turnout.208 A 
second study examining senate roll call voting from 1974 to 2001 found that 
senators standing for reelection appear almost twenty percent more likely to be 
responsive to the preferences of voters.209 Whatever one may think about the 
allocation of federal pork as a measure of representation, these studies certain-
ly demonstrate that voting matters.210 
Overrepresentation of socioeconomic elites among actual voters translates 
into an electorate whose views bear much closer resemblance to those of mon-
eyed interests than the eligible electorate’s, especially with respect to economic 
issues.211 Thus, even if one succeeded in organizing and informing those who 
                                                                                                                           
 207 A longitudinal study of all fifty states from 1978 to 1990, found “an enduring relationship 
between the degree of mobilization of lower-class voters and the generosity of welfare benefits,” 
while identifying conditions under which that relationship does not prevail. Kim Quaile Hill et al., 
Lower-Class Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the U.S. States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75, 75, 79, 82 
(1995). Their original study investigating state-level policy consequences of the underrepresentation 
of lower income voters in the electorate, which relied on data from a single year, also found that the 
class bias of the electorate is “one of the most prominent, independent explanations of variations in 
welfare spending” among states. Kim Quaile Hill & Jan. E. Leighley, The Policy Consequences of 
Class Bias in State Electorates, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 351, 358, 361 (1992). 
 208 Paul S. Martin, Voting’s Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional Allo-
cation of Federal Money, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 116, 123 (2003) (finding that “[m]embers of Con-
gress appear to shift money toward areas that vote at higher rates” and do so strategically in order to 
“improve their electoral fortunes”). 
 209 See, e.g., John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. POL. 1206, 
1209, 1218 n.16, 1221, 1223 (2005) (noting further that in response to reviewers’ comments, addi-
tional testing was undertaken which revealed that senators’ responsiveness to voters could not be 
explained by the hypothesis that senators “overrepresent whites, older citizens, and constituents with 
higher incomes” rather than voters). 
 210 See Martin, supra note 208, at 123 (concluding that “[i]f participation were more widespread, 
political actors would have to make harder choices about whom to represent and how to distribute 
resources in society”). 
 211 Cf. Winters & Page, supra note 31, at 738 (explaining that “the likely sympathy or (at worst) 
indifference of most of the rest of the top 10 percent” to the intense interests of the super-wealthy, 
defined as the top tenth of 1% of U.S. households, likely explains their political successes); see also 
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currently turnout such that they provided a credible counterweight to the pull 
of moneyed interests, elected officials would experience that counterweight as 
lighter than if a wider swath of the eligible electorate voted regularly. 
Not since the late nineteenth century has anywhere close to 90% of the el-
igible electorate voted.212 The 2008 presidential election brought out a mere 
62% of the electorate.213 Although turnout for midterm elections is notoriously 
low, it is a sorry state of affairs when Americans get excited because in six 
states—five of which had competitive elections and three of which permit vot-
ers to register on Election Day—voter turnout exceeded 50% of the eligible 
electorate.214 In 2014, less than a third of the eligible electorate voted in the 
three largest states: California, Texas, and New York.215 
Low turnout might not be a problem if the electorate that did turn out was 
representative of the public. Indeed, until quite recently, American political 
scientists did not consider low voter turnout to be a problem.216 The dominant 
perspective was that low voter turnout indicated political stability and public 
contentment.217 The primary empirical claim made was that voters adequately, 
if virtually, represented nonvoters.218 
The virtual representation thesis is increasingly difficult to defend. The 
socioeconomic bias in voting is well established: Those at the top of the socio-
                                                                                                                           
BENJAMIN I. PAGE & CARI LYNN HENNESSY, WHAT AFFLUENT AMERICANS WANT FROM POLITICS 
8–11 (2010) (finding more differences between the political preferences of the top 4% of income 
earners and those of lower-income Americans, than between the top 33% of income earners and those 
of lower-income Americans, especially with respect to economic policy). 
 212 See Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections: 1828–2012, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php [https://perma.cc/73CH-ZWLV]. 
 213 Curtis Gans, 2012 Election Turnout Dips Below 2008 and 2004 Levels: Number of Eligible 
Voters Increases by Eight Million, Five Million Fewer Votes Cast, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/2012%20Voter%20Turnout%20Full%20Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AB4F-PVWH] (noting that turnout dipped to 57.5% in 2012). 
 214 Reid Wilson, Opinion, Best State in America: Maine, for Voter Turnout, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/best-state-in-america-maine-for-voter-turnout/2014/
11/07/74511ff2-65f5-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html [https://perma.cc/G2VC-A69U]. 
 215 Editorial, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-turnout-in-72-years.html [https://perma.cc/H92V-
9H63] (noting that the 2014 midterm election saw the lowest level of turnout since 1940, with an 
estimated 36.6% of eligible voters showing up to vote). 
 216 Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 98 (noting that traditionally the class bias of the American 
electorate “has appeared to be an insignificant problem . . . for American democracy” and, further, 
that some political scientists suggest that the overrepresentation of wealthier and more educated citi-
zens among the electorate is likely to result in more democratic and better quality political outcomes). 
 217 Id. (explaining that “a long line of . . . political scientists have argued that nonparticipation 
may be interpreted as a sign of contentment”); accord FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. 
CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON’T VOTE AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 3–4 
(2000) (explaining that a large body of political science contends nonvoting should not be considered 
a problem but rather as a tacit expression of consent and evidence of satisfaction). 
 218 See, e.g., Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of 
Uneven Turnout in City Politics, 67 J. POL. 515, 516 (2005) (critically reviewing that literature). 
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economic ladder are much more likely to vote, although the magnitude of the 
bias varies by state.219 In 2004, “[n]early 9 out of 10 individuals in families 
with incomes over $75,000 reported voting in presidential elections” while 
only 50% “of those in families with incomes under $15,000 reported vot-
ing.”220 Even in the 2008 presidential election, in which Democrats empha-
sized mobilizing lower-income, minority voters, Americans with household 
incomes below the median made up only 38% of the electorate, although they 
represented 55% of the population while “Americans with household incomes 
over $100,000” made up 26% of the electorate, although they represented 
about 16% of the U.S. population.221 The class bias of the electorate tends to 
be worse for midterms.222 Those who turn out on election days are not just 
wealthier; they are also whiter, older, and more educated than the eligible elec-
torate.223 
New studies demonstrate that these demographic differences translate in 
turn into significant ideological differences between voters and nonvoters.224 
Americans from different socioeconomic backgrounds exhibit different prefer-
ences, especially when it comes to economic policies such as welfare spending 
and taxation.225 A study comparing the political views of voters and nonvoters, 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See, e.g., Flavin, supra note 63, at 408–09, 409 fig.1 (showing that although the affluent are 
more likely to turnout in every state, the magnitude of the participation gap between those in the 25th 
and 75th income percentiles varies significantly by state); Hill & Leighley, supra note 207, at 354 
(reporting that “there is bias in favor of the wealthy in every state electorate, but there is considerable 
diversity among the states in the degree of that bias”). 
 220 APSA Task Force, supra note 15, at 656. 
 221 See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 97. 
 222 Bonica et al., supra note 76, at 111. 
 223 See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 97 (noting further that “[c]ompared to wealthier citizens, 
lower income Americans tend to vote at lower rates and to participate less in a variety of other politi-
cal behaviors, including writing letters to members of Congress and protesting”). But see Lisa García 
Bedolla & Kerry L. Haynie, The Obama Coalition and the Future of American Politics, 1 POL., 
GROUPS, & IDENTITIES 128, 128 (2013) (noting that the overrepresentation of whites in the electorate 
is declining). 
 224 It is likely that discrepancies between the views of voters and nonvoters are underrepresented 
by current research. See, e.g., Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 99 (arguing that the existing survey data 
underrepresent the differences between voters and nonvoters insofar as “lower income individuals are 
disproportionately likely to skip survey questions or to answer ‘don’t know’”). 
 225 See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr., supra note 5, at 8 (finding significant differences between the 
views of those with family incomes of less than $30,000 and those with family incomes of at least 
$75,000, especially with respect to redistributive policies). But compare Stuart N. Soroka & Christo-
pher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 321, 323–
24 (2008) (arguing that the policy consequences of unequal representation are insignificant because 
only rarely—such as in relation to tax and welfare policy—do low and high-income Americans differ 
in their policy preferences), with Martin Gilens, Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation, 42 
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 335, 338–40 (2009) (convincingly demonstrating that Soroka and Wlezien’s 
finding was largely a product of their limited data and that once a larger set of policy preferences are 
analyzed it is clear that low- and high-income Americans have significantly divergent policy prefer-
ences on a range of issues, even beyond the economic). 
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from 1974 to 2001, found that “[v]oters and nonvoters significantly differ[ed] 
in 24 of 44 states [studied] . . . with voters almost always more conserva-
tive.”226 The authors concluded that “[w]hether or not a conservatively biased 
electorate can help elect a Republican, it seems to move Senators’ roll-call 
votes in a conservative direction.”227 
Even studies that defend the discipline’s historic view of nonvoting often 
concede that voters and nonvoters have distinct views on public policy. For 
example, one study that compared the attitudes of voters and nonvoters in the 
first two presidential elections of the 1990s found that with respect to a number 
of major issues, including whether spending should be “increased, decreased, 
or kept about the same” for twelve different federal programs, “voters were 
more conservative than the entire adult population in 1996.”228 For 1992, they 
found voters and nonvoters also differed in their views on abortion.229 
The debate in the literature is primarily over how much the ideological 
differences between voters and nonvoters matter, and, in this regard, much 
turns on how mattering is operationalized in the research design. For example, 
one study concluded that nonvoting did not significantly affect national politics 
in the Clinton years because the differences between voters and nonvoters 
would not have changed policy outcomes with respect to President Clinton’s 
two main policy initiatives—the adoption of welfare reforms and the failure of 
health insurance reforms.230 
Researchers who contend nonvoting matters accept that electoral partici-
pation of nonvoters may not shift the party affiliation of those elected national-
ly or the ultimate outcome of particular congressional votes but highlight the 
measurable effects it has on the ideological voting patterns of elected officials 
in the aggregate.231 The significance of nonvoting is even starker at the state 
and local level where turnout is lower and bias even more extreme.232 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Griffin & Newman, supra note 209, at 1213–14. 
 227 Id. at 1221, 1223. 
 228 See Benjamin Highton & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Political Implications of Higher Turn-
out, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 179, 185–88, 186 tbl. 2 (2001) (noting further that in both 1992 and 1996, 
voters and nonvoters differed by ten percentage points or more on whether they had a view about 
government services, government medical insurance plans, environmental regulation, and defense 
spending). 
 229 Id. at 184. 
 230 Id. at 185. In general, research that concludes nonvoting does not matter has sought to measure 
whether increasing turnout would benefit the Democratic Party. See, e.g., Jack Citrin et al., What if 
Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
75, 77, 79, 87 (2003) (examining ninety-one races for the U.S. Senate in the 1990s and finding that 
“[w]hile nonvoters are generally more Democratic than voters,” across all regions except for the 
Midwest, “the dearth of close races means that very few election outcomes would have changed had 
everyone voted” and that these results generally hold true also for “equal turnout rates for whites and 
African-Americans” and for “equal turnout rates across income groups”). 
 231 Griffin & Newman, supra note 209, at 1216. The significance of nonvoting is generally agreed 
to be starker at the state and local level where turnout is lower and bias even more extreme. See, e.g., 
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C. Expanding the Electorate—Strategies for the Short and Long Term 
The unrepresentativeness of both the primary and general electorate takes 
its toll on democratic accountability. Increasing turnout during party primaries 
is likely to provide the most immediate bang for the buck on the accountability 
front. Another reasonable preliminary goal would be to bring out at every gen-
eral election the electorate that typically turns out in presidential years. Long-
term, however, reformers need to set their sights much higher, seeking a more 
broadly representative electorate. 
Getting voters out is hard. The biggest barriers are time and inclination.233 
That said, legislative reforms for addressing voters’ time constraints already 
exist. They include simplifying voter registration procedures, expanding the 
timeframe within which voters can register to vote, and providing early morn-
ing and evening polling hours.234 In many places, moreover, a number of these 
reforms have been adopted thanks to the National Voter Registration Act of 
1993.235 The emerging consensus among political scientists is, therefore, that 
the costs associated with voting are no longer a significant barrier, although 
some states are certainly doing their best to change that.236 Instead, the primary 
impediments “to a truly democratic voting public” are “[p]olitical information 
and interest.”237 As one political scientist has concluded, “the only way to . . . 
increase[e] turnout and eliminat[e] socioeconomic bias in the voting popula-
                                                                                                                           
Hajnal & Trounstine, supra note 218, at 515, 517–18 (criticizing the existing research for minimizing 
the chances of finding that low voter turnout affects “who wins and loses elections . . . because it 
focuses largely on national elections where turnout is relatively high and where minority groups are 
generally too small a percentage of the population to sway elections”). 
 232 Cf. Hajnal & Trounstine, supra note 218, at 515, 517–18 (criticizing the existing research for 
minimizing the chances of finding that low voter turnout affects “who wins and loses elections . . . 
because it focuses largely on national elections where turnout is relatively high and where minority 
groups are generally too small a percentage of the population to sway elections”). 
 233 In this regard, the socioeconomic bias of the electorate makes perfect sense. Those who are 
wealthier have both more control over their time and more incentive to make time to vote because 
they know what they have to gain or lose. 
 234 See, e.g., Michael W. Traugott, Why Electoral Reform Has Failed: If You Build It, Will They 
Come?, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 
167, 167–70 (Ann N. Crigler et al. eds., 2004). 
 235 See, e.g., Benjamin Highton, Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States, 2 PERSP. ON 
POL. 507, 507, 509 (2004) (arguing, among other things, that “registration reform has probably 
reached its limits of enhancing turnout”). 
 236 See, e.g., Traugott, supra note 234, at 167–70 (noting that while the cumulative effects of 
various administrative barriers to voting may be more substantial, specific initiatives to ease the bur-
den of voting typically create only single-digit increases in Election Day turnout). On recent efforts to 
increase the effort required to vote, particularly in states controlled by Republican legislatures, see 
Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370–71 (2015). 
 237 See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United 
States, 33 AM. POL. RES. 471, 473 (2005) (arguing that “[i]nstitutional change alone will not bring 
about a democratic electorate”). 
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 New studies, moreover, show that the electorate is not actually “com-
posed of ‘peripheral’ voters who join the ‘core’ voters only in high-stimulus 
elections.”241 Instead, it consists of three categories of voters: die-hard voters 
who vote in virtually every election; transient or intermittent voters who vote 
regularly but not at every opportunity; and true nonvoters, some of whom are 
unregistered.242 Transient voters are demographically quite similar to con-
sistent voters. They tend to be registered, and their intermittent voting is typi-
cally unrelated to politics but instead a product of happenstance (weather, 
work, and illness).243 These characteristics make them relatively easy to mobi-
lize, especially as compared to eligible voters who are unregistered. 
Increasing turnout in off-cycle and down-ballot elections, at least initially, 
is simply a matter of bringing out so-called transient voters. Why hasn’t this 
been happening? 
It is largely because the task has been left to candidates and political par-
ties, who have little incentive to radically increase turnout. The governing as-
sumption in the rational choice model of voting that dominates the field is that 
voter turnout should be left to partisan actors because they have the greatest 
incentive to get people to the polls. Recognizing that candidates and parties 
have little interest in being held accountable to the eligible electorate’s views, 
the model depends on party competition. Competitive elections, it is argued, 
provide each party with an incentive to mobilize the electorate (high turnout) 
and, in turn, to address the interests of the median voter (democratic accounta-
bility and legitimacy). 
There is little question that under conditions of competitive elections, 
candidates and political parties are “somewhat responsive to citizen prefer-
ences,” but it is a mistake to forget that their operating principle is to “cede as 
little policy to voters as possible.”244 Moreover, elections today are increasing-
ly uncompetitive. Once candidates know that they are a shoe-in at the general 
election, they have no incentive to broaden the electorate. It is no accident that 
                                                                                                                           
 241 Berinsky, supra note 237, at 476. 
 242 Oregon, for example, is distinctive in having relatively progressive voting laws and a long 
tradition of high voter turnout. Nevertheless, a 2001 study of five elections in Oregon shows “that the 
movement of citizens in and out of the electorate does not conform to a view of [the] electorate as 
composed of ‘peripheral’ voters who join the ‘core’ voters only in high-stimulus elections.” See id. 
Instead, the 2001 study “found that the vast majority of registered voters, 65% were ‘transient voters’ 
who moved in and out of the electorate over the election series” and further that only “25% were ‘con-
stant voters’ who turned out in all five elections [whereas] . . . 10% were chronic ‘non-voters’ who 
never cast a ballot, though they were eligible to do so.” Id. Its findings have been substantiated by 
similar studies. Id. 
 243 See Traugott, supra note 234, at 177 (explaining that “there are really three groups of citizens 
among the registered: those who vote all the time, those who never vote, and those who wander in and 
out of the electorate as personal circumstances and political contexts change”). 
 244 Cf. Bawn et al., supra note 21, at 572. 
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a key attribute of nonvoters is that they have not been asked to vote.245 As the 
electorate has become more polarized, political parties have determined it is 
easier and more efficient to bring out a select electorate. A campaign’s best bet 
is to target its strongest supporters,246 and, among those supporters, to focus on 
those who are most likely to show up—i.e., better educated, wealthier vot-
ers.247 
In the end, from the perspective of candidate and party, the smaller the 
electorate that turns out the better, both because it is cheaper and because it 
gives them freer rein to govern. Competitive elections may improve align-
ment,248 but they do not change the fact that it is expensive and politically 
risky to get out the mass electorate.249 
Assuming the task of galvanizing the electorate has been left to the wrong 
actors, what alternatives are available? Civic associations, with grassroots ba-
ses, once again, are probably the best bet, but regulatory changes will likely be 
required if they are to effectively mobilize voters. The legally required fire-
walls between tax-exempt groups’ partisan and nonpartisan activities, for one, 
might need to be modified. In addition, an exception to existing prohibitions 
on private foundations engaging in partisan activities, as applied to the funding 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See, e.g., Highton & Wolfinger, supra note 228, at 188 (“We found solid confirmation of 
Lijphart’s proposition that non-voters ‘have not been politically mobilized,’ which we define as being 
canvassed either by telephone or in person. . . . In 1992, 31 per cent of voters and 10 per cent of non-
voters were canvassed. The figures for 1996 were 38 per cent of voters and 14 per cent of non-
voters.”); see also CAIN, supra note 27, at 46 (noting that “[i]n the increasingly sophisticated Ameri-
can political campaign environment, basic demographic information such as a voter’s age and gender, 
party affiliation, or the frequency with which he or she votes determine[s] the substance and volume of 
contacts citizens get from opposing candidates and political parties”) (emphasis added). 
 246 ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 200, at 105 (noting that in recent years, “party organizations and 
candidates have been devoting more of their resources to grassroots voter registration and get-out-the-
vote . . . campaigns aimed at core party supporters” and attributing this shift to the rise of safe dis-
tricts). 
 247 Soss & Jacobs, supra note 3, at 115, 118 (noting that parties today have “reduce[d] their in-
vestments in mobilizing middle-and lower income voters” and that the result has been a significant 
shift of “party mobilization efforts . . . toward higher income voters” in ways that “reinforce rather 
than combat underlying patterns of political inequality”). 
 248 It is perhaps worth noting in this regard that, in 2014, competitiveness did not result in high 
turnout elections. Three states with competitive elections that made national news, Georgia (34.1%), 
Virginia (36.7%), and North Carolina (40.7%) had estimated low turnout, even by 2014 election 
standards. Carl Bialik & Reuben Fischer-Baum, Preliminary Turnout Numbers Are Way Down from 
2010 and 2012, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 5, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/preliminary-
turnout-numbers-are-way-down-from-2010-and-2012/ [https://perma.cc/A9EQ-YMP8] (citing work 
of Michael P. McDonald of the University of Florida). 
 249 See generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 217 (arguing that political parties became com-
fortable with a smaller electorate during the early twentieth century and lost the incentive to bring out 
more of the electorate and that this explains the declines in turnout in the twentieth century). 
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of get-out-the-vote activities organized by non-profit civic and political associ-
ations, should be considered.250 
A more radical alternative would be to change the incentives of partisan 
actors by making voting mandatory. There are good reasons to believe that a 
mandatory law—in particular, one that required eligible voters to show up at 
the polls but did not require casting a valid ballot—would be constitutional.251 
Knowing that all eligible voters would be participating would significantly 
change the incentives of candidates and political parties. Now, candidates and 
political parties would have every reason to court, educate, and cater to the 
preferences of the entire electorate.252 
Short of a radical transformation of the electorate, a significant uptick in 
voter turnout during contested party primaries, which is also highly variable by 
state, is likely to provide the most immediate bang for the buck on the ac-
countability front. Increasing turnout would restore to the general electorate its 
say at the decisive moment. It would, thereby, address a significant source of 
the slack in the accountability of elected officials by reducing the tension offi-
cials today experience between satisfying the preferences of the party base to 
avoid being ousted in a future primary and representing their districts. 
Increasing turnout during primaries, however, will require some creative 
thinking. First, unable to rely on party labels, voters, even those who regularly 
vote in general elections, struggle to find reliable cues about primary candi-
dates.253 These difficulties are especially acute in down-ballot elections where 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 286–88 (making similar proposals regarding tax policy). The last 
two election cycles have seen a version of this process, with the rise of billionaire-funded PACs devel-
oped to mobilize young and Latino voters, with an emphasis on person-to-person contact. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Confessore & Julia Preston, Soros and Other Liberal Donors to Fund Bid to Spur Latino Vot-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/us/politics/george-soros-and-
other-liberal-donors-to-fund-bid-to-spur-latino-voters.html [https://perma.cc/W44Y-FCEY]; Coral Dav-
enport, Billionaire Environmentalist to Spend $25 Million to Turn Out Young Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/us/politics/thomas-steyer-nextgen-climate-change-
voters.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VD82-M7Z9]. An obvious additional political payoff to turning to 
civic associations, especially those with local chapters, such as the National Rifle Association or the 
Medical Students for Choice, is that it might also produce a better-informed electorate. 
 251 For an interesting article charting a path to the adoption of compulsory voting starting with 
municipal reform, see Nicholas Stephanopoulos, A Feasible Roadmap to Compulsory Voting, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/a-feasible-roadmap-
to-compulsory-voting/413422/ [https://perma.cc/MH3V-BZ6E]. For more on the various ways com-
pulsory voting laws can be drafted, the experiences of other nations with them and why they would 
not be unconstitutional, see Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2169–
73 (1996) and Lisa Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Solu-
tion?, 18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 207, 217–23 (2006). Both authors emphasize that the substantial in-
crease in turnout associated with such laws is largely a product of the social norms such laws create or 
reinforce, as penalties are often low and enforcement lax. 
 252 Thanks go to Jack Balkin for drawing out this scenario. 
 253 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 
71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1767 (1993) (summarizing the problem with primaries). 
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the media tends not to cover primary elections in much depth.254 Efforts like 
CrowdPac.org could prove to be a game-changer, especially if expanded to 
focus more systematically on contested primaries.255 CrowdPac provides vot-
ers both an ideological measure of the candidates running the race based on 
objective data and the opportunity to share a personalized ballot with friends 
and associates. 
Once again, revitalized civic groups could also help. There is already evi-
dence that voters who are connected to professional and community organiza-
tions have an easier time with the informational barriers posed by primaries.256 
My own anecdotal experience, as a recent participant in a mayoral primary in 
Philadelphia, is consistent with this account. Despite the fact that the mayoral 
primary was highly contested, it was quite difficult to obtain useful infor-
mation about the candidates. By contrast, as a member of the local chapter of 
the National Lawyers Guild, I had no difficultly obtaining detailed substantive 
information about the down-ballot, judicial candidates. 
A second significant obstacle relates to the fact that party insiders are 
likely to resist efforts to expand the primary electorate. Although the days of 
the party boss are largely gone, informal party networks have emerged to fill 
the function of controlling nominations. These networks depend on low voter 
turnout during the primary election to consolidate their power over nomina-
tions. This is because their ability to effectively determine the outcome of the 
primary depends on predictability: “The primary election, with its low turnout 
and low information environment, is much easier . . . to manipulate than the 
general election.”257 
Finally a caution, while there is a place for legislative reforms to ease the 
administrative burdens associated with the act of voting, we must be extremely 
careful not to adopt reforms that inadvertently increase the socioeconomic bias 
of the electorate. Reforms that make it more convenient to vote—such as early 
voting, permissive absentee voting and voting-by-mail—ironically increase 
inequality.258 The effect results from the fact that such reforms increase turn-
                                                                                                                           
 254 Bawn et al., supra note 21, at 575 (noting that “[m]edia coverage of primaries is generally less 
heavy than in general elections”). 
 255 This Is the New Politics, CROWDPAC, https://www.crowdpac.com/about [https://perma.cc/
9JBH-VMCK]. 
 256 Cf. Bawn et al., supra note 21, at 575 (noting that “[t]he voters who pay closest attention in 
primaries often have ties to local interest groups and activists, further contributing to the capacity of 
policy demanders to control the outcome”). 
 257 Cf. MASKET, supra note 140, at 46–47. 
 258 Berinsky, supra note 237, at 477–81 (reviewing a series of studies of voting by mail, early 
voting, and absentee voting, and concluding that a number of popular reforms, including early voting 
and permissive absentee voting, significantly “increase the socioeconomic bias of the electorate”); 
Elizabeth Rigby & Melanie J. Springer, Does Electoral Reform Increase (or Decrease) Political 
Equality?, 64 POL. RES. Q. 420, 424, 428–30 (2011) (offering a theoretical explanation and confirm-
ing the results in a study of midterm and presidential elections from 1978 to 2008). 
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out, largely by ensuring that “politically engaged voters,” who happen also to 
be socioeconomically better off, “continue to come to the polls election after 
election” rather than by engaging new voters or addressing the existing socio-
economic bias in the state’s registration rolls.259 Reforms that make registration 
more convenient, such as mail-in registration and automatic registration, have 
their own limitations: They decrease the socioeconomic bias of the registration 
rolls without addressing the reasons less well off citizens stay home on Elec-
tion Day—an absence of interest, information, mobilization, time, and pay.260 
Reforms that collapse the two stages of voting (registration and voting) by 
permitting registration on Election Day appear to increase both turnout and 
representativeness,261 but, even here, there is some empirical debate.262 
Ironically, it is some of the least discussed reforms—early voting on Sun-
days, especially if combined with same-day registration, and making Election 
Day a federal holiday—that are likely to be the most promising ones.263 The 
reasons for states to adopt early voting on Sundays or to make Election Day a 
holiday go well beyond lowering the costs of voting for those who work or do 
not have cars. The best way to draw voters to the polls on Election Day is 
through friends and associates.264 
                                                                                                                           
 259 Berinsky, supra note 237, at 473; see also Rigby & Springer, supra note 258, at 231 (noting 
further that states vary in the degree of the income bias of their registration rolls and the resulting 
effect therefore is most extreme in states with the most skewed rolls). 
 260 Rigby & Springer, supra note 258, at 424, 428–30. 
 261 Id. at 424, 428–30; see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, AUTOMATIC AND PERMANENT 
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The Unanticipated Consequence of Election Reform, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 95, 102, 108 (2014) (arguing 
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 263 Accord Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of 
the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, 44 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1, 3, 11 (1950) (recommending holding elections on weekends or making Election Day a federal 
holiday). 
 264 Abu El-Haj, supra note 14, at 95 (discussing the Obama campaign’s use of this insight in 2012 
and summarizing empirical support for this proposition). 
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Everything we know about how to increase voter participation suggests 
that social networks are key.265 It is no accident that in addition to being better 
educated and more politically engaged, the registered voters, who turned out at 
around 85% in 1992, 1996, and 2000, were also “more socially connected than 
non-registered citizens.”266 Making voting a social activity (maybe even fes-
tive with a Fourth of July style parade and fireworks) has the potential to both 
draw out voters and make them better informed.267 Testimony from a trial 
court hearing, in a challenge to North Carolina’s repeal of Sunday voting 
(known as “Souls to the Polls” in African-American communities), captures 
this dynamic: 
“Souls to the Polls” is important to the African Americans in my 
congregation and community. It is a way for family members across 
2 and 3 generations to vote together. As we take the bus rides to the 
polls, we share the stories of the sacrifices that people have made to 
give us the right to vote. We share with the younger generation of 
voters what Jim Crow was like. We sing freedom songs on the way 
to the polls. It is a sense of pride and honor that most of our young 
people don’t get to experience living here in America. Many of our 
young people are discouraged and won’t participate in the electoral 
process unless older generations encourage them.268 
Private efforts like those of the Alliance for Social Justice’s, which hosted a 
barbecue in a local park in West Palm Beach in 2012, should be encouraged as 
well.269 
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In sum, the reforms that are championed should dovetail with the ultimate 
goal of increasing democratic accountability. Limited resources should be care-
fully allocated to both fronts in the struggle—organization and turnout. With 
respect to the latter, popular reforms that increase the socioeconomic bias of 
the electorate should be avoided. For instance, although Hillary Clinton’s re-
cent proposal to create permanent registration is certainly reasonable, it is un-
likely to change the incentives of partisan actors, and, like other similar re-
forms that reduce the cost of registration, it is unlikely to significantly enhance 
turnout or reduce the socioeconomic bias of the electorate. 
D. Political Participation and Partisan Polarization 
Before concluding, one potential worry must be addressed: Would in-
creasing electoral participation inadvertently exacerbate legislative gridlock by 
increasing polarization?270 For a number of reasons, this concern seems over-
blown in this context. 
If the result of activating eligible voters is the rise of an even more parti-
san electorate and, in turn, more polarized legislatures, then we should take 
heart that our elected bodies are functioning as representative bodies (if not as 
governing bodies). If Richard H. Pildes is correct that polarization is a sign of 
the progress the United States has made toward a genuinely inclusive and egal-
itarian democracy, polarization would be representative democracy at work.271 
The crisis of representation that drives campaign finance reformers (and this 
project as an alternative path to a similar end) is the overwhelming evidence of 
a disconnect between the preferences of the American electorate and the policy 
outputs of its legislatures. 
That said, it is not entirely clear that the stark ideological difference be-
tween the political parties is a product of an increasingly polarized elec-
torate.272 Many believe the phenomenon is either elite driven or limited to citi-
zens who are politically active.273 Equally important, the data driving the lit-
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growing polarization of voters, but the declining responsiveness of American politicians to the elec-
toral middle.”); Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. 6 
(June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-
public/ [https://perma.cc/8QZY-HVLR] (reporting increased political polarization, especially “among 
those who are the most engaged and active in the political process” such as primary voters, campaign 
contributors, and campaign volunteers). 
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erature shows that those who are politically active and engaged tend to have 
extreme partisan views whereas “[n]on-voters . . . tend to clump toward the 
middle of the liberal-conservative spectrum.”274 There is, however, no way of 
knowing in advance whether the “least politically active, and least engaged 
citizens . . . are the most centrist” because they are inactive, or whether they 
are inactive because they are centrist and do not like the options before 
them.275 
CONCLUSION 
Curtailing the outsized political influence of moneyed elites depends on 
empowering ordinary Americans in politics rather than restricting the flow of 
money in elections—if only because of the significant constraints the First 
Amendment imposes on the latter project. Leveraging the electorate to rein in 
the undue influence of the super-wealthy, however, will require more than 
turning out additional voters on Election Day. To counteract the incentives 
elected officials have to obfuscate their legislative record, the electorate needs 
to be informed, attentive, and demanding, and to remain so when the campaign 
lights go off and the media turn away. This requires the promotion of interme-
diary associations (civic groups but also political parties) that would be better 
able to advance democratic accountability. Reform efforts that simply focus on 
getting voters out on election days come too late. At the same time, increasing 
the representativeness of the electorate that turns out to vote must remain a key 
priority for the field of election law. Enhanced democratic accountability is 
unlikely to emerge if the electorate remains narrow and unrepresentative, espe-
cially during party primaries. 
The task of leveraging the electorate will be difficult, but it is this task, ra-
ther than the traditional course of campaign finance reform and First Amend-
ment litigation, on which reform-minded lawyers need to double down, and 
soon. Chasing after reforms aimed at taking money out of politics and doctri-
nal theories aimed at justifying those reforms has run its course. Resources 
would be better invested in long-term efforts to organize citizens into an en-
gaged, informed, and representative electorate. This is because the proposed 
electoral strategy might actually work. The same cannot be said for the cam-
paign finance strategy. Even if meaningful campaign finance reforms were 
passed, so long as the public remained politically inactive and uninformed, the 
super-wealthy would continue to influence the policies enacted, and perhaps 
                                                                                                                           
 274 Pildes, supra note 200, at 279; see also ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 200, at 5 (arguing that parti-
san, ideological polarization is driven, not by elites, but by the politically engaged public—those who 
are attentive, informed and active citizens—while noting that “[i]t is among the uninterested, unin-
formed, and inactive that ideological moderation and independence flourish”). 
 275 Pildes, supra note 200, at 279. 
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more significantly those shelved, through lobbying and other constitutionally 
protected efforts, while ordinary Americans basked in their imagined victory. 
   
 
